Operationalising AI Ethical Principles in Higher Education with the UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence by Policy Makers and Global Universities

Executive summary

The rapid use of artificial intelligence (AI) tools in higher education creates new governance challenges. Universities worldwide face growing concerns about safety, privacy, unfair algorithms and threats to learning process and academic integrity. Without proper governance systems, AI tools’ adoption risks increasing inequalities, reducing learning quality and violating the fundamental rights of students and educators.

The UNESCO’s “Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence” adopted in 2021 represents the first global standard on AI ethics and applies to 194 UNESCO member states. It provides a universal framework of values, principles and actions to guide development and use of AI systems and to protect human rights in the AI era. However, putting these principles into practice requires approaches that reflect the diverse social, cultural and political realities across different countries and institutions.

This policy brief examines AI governance strategies across 16 countries on five continents: South America (Chile, Colombia, Ecuador), Africa (Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Rwanda, South Africa, Tunisia), Asia (China, Kazakhstan, United Arab Emirates), Europe (Sweden,  Latvia) and North America (United States). The analysis maps national regulations and institutional practices against UNESCO’s ten core ethical principles. It shows how governments and higher education institutions are implementing global standards in practice in ways relevant to their local contexts.

This analysis leads to five priority recommendations for policymakers and higher education leaders. First, adopt human rights-based AI frameworks with clearly defined red lines. These should align with international human rights standards and link to higher education institutions accreditation requirements. Second, maintain responsible data governance applying the principle of privacy-by-design. Prohibit unauthorised entry of personal data into third-party tools. Conduct impact assessments for high-risk systems. Third, strengthen human oversight, transparency and accountability. Ensure all important AI decisions undergo human review. Fourth, make AI literacy universal and relevant across all disciplines. Embed ethics, critical thinking and responsible use across all programmes both in technical and non-technical disciplines. Support this with funded educator training programmes. Fifth, conduct ethical procurement and evaluation throughout the AI lifecycle. Contracts should include transparency clauses and provisions to prohibit the use of systems that violate ethical standards.

The ethical deployment of AI tools in higher education demands a multi-level commitment: users must possess adequate understanding of these tools, institutions must establish transparent guidelines and enforce them through monitoring mechanisms, and governments must provide resources for capacity development. This necessitates integrated action combining bottom-up institutional initiatives with top-down government legislation and technical support. Implementation requires coordinated action from policymakers, institutional leaders, administrators, faculty, students and community partners. Shared governance and collaboration across disciplines are essential. 

Background. The adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) tools in higher education is at the forefront of conversations worldwide. Universities have become testbeds for generative AI (GenAI) tools in teaching, research and administration (European Commission, 2022). The growing debate on AI in education spans a continuum from innovation to regulation: at one end, those who advocate rapid implementation of AI tools; at the other, those who raise alarms about the existential risks of AI. In the middle, a third group of voices advocates ethical principles and academic standards for the adoption of AI systems that are fair, safe and inclusive for all higher education stakeholders. 

Drawing on diverse voices of higher education institutions (HEI) leaders and researchers from five continents, this policy brief examines AI governance strategies, policies and practices across 16 countries. At the macro level, we review the most prominent national AI regulations, standards and ethical guidelines informing HEIs governance. At the micro level, some exemplary practices at selected HEIs within each country. Recognising that AI governance reflects the unique local social, cultural and political realities of each country, the cases presented aim to encourage reflection and dialogue on what is relevant and has been adopted across different contexts.  

Problem statement. The rapid adoption of AI systems, especially GenAI tools, in higher education presents complex global challenges. Leaders in HEIs are increasingly confronting the reality of AI-assisted work in classrooms and administrative operations. Applications range from personalised content to meet learners’ needs to tutoring support, enrollment processing and AI-enabled chatbots for student support (European Commission, 2022). 

Rising concerns about safety, disinformation, privacy, bias, the absence of transparency, accountability and human oversight pose challenges for governance, equity and inclusion (UNESCO, 2025).  The use of AI-enabled tools in the classroom is associated with mental health impacts, reduced trust in institutions and overreliance on AI systems, with effects on learning quality and student retention (World Bank, 2025). The use of GenAI tools raises concerns about the authenticity of learners’ work, the erosion of their critical thinking skills, the lack of depth in their learning and the loss of human connectedness (Bozkurt et al., 2024). Broader risks to inclusivity arise when AI tools are trained on data from a narrow set of contexts, which can erase diverse perspectives and reinforce stereotypes rooted in specific geographic regions (Miao and Holmes, 2023). The absence of governance mechanisms to ensure that AI tool selection aligns with educational goals, safety and fairness poses an additional challenge for equity and inclusion (OECD, 2024). 

Policy analysis. The implementation of AI ethics in higher education institutions worldwide is as diverse as the countries in which they are located, the types of HEIs, their constituencies and their socio-economic contexts. While national governments and international organisations are increasingly adopting global policy and ethical frameworks to govern AI (CAIDP, 2026), the implementation of these frameworks into ethical principles, policies and regulations reflects their own governance structures, cultural norms and digital readiness. 

The purpose of this policy brief is to share global examples reflecting on: 

(1) How are policymakers and HEIs leaders operationalising the UNESCO Recommendations on the Ethics of AI? 

(2) How can AI ethics, safety and inclusivity in higher education be both globally informed and locally grounded?  

The 16 countries under study constitute a non-exhaustive sample across diverse continents. The analysis is organised according to the ten core principles of the Recommendation and maps national laws, policies and university guidelines. The analysis also considers actions undertaken by countries or specific HEIs, within Policy Area 8: Education and Research, which underscore commitments to adequate AI literacy to enable individuals to make informed decisions about the use of AI systems (para. 101), development of AI ethics curricula (para. 106), support for AI ethics research (para. 107), training of AI researchers on AI ethics, and ensuring critical evaluation of AI research through independent scientific research (para. 110-111) (UNESCO, 2022).

Principle 1: Proportionality and Do No Harm operationalised as Human Rights-Based Frameworks for Harm Prevention 

The use of AI systems must be proportionate to the legitimate aim, should not infringe on human rights and should be scientifically based and appropriate to the context. Provisions must be in place for rigorous risk assessment to prevent and mitigate harm, with final human determination in irreversible or life-and-death decisions (UNESCO, 2022, para. 25 – 26). Ethical  values  and  principles  can  help  develop  and  implement  rights-based  policy measures and legal norms.  

Risk classification systems were enacted in the “European Union (EU) Artificial Intelligence Act” (EU AI Act), the first legally binding AI regulation globally relevant to the EU member states (European Union, 2024). The use of AI systems in admissions, assessment and student monitoring is classified as high risk, ‘with strict requirements, including risk-mitigation systems, high-quality data sets, logging of activity, detailed documentation, clear user information, human oversight, and a high level of robustness, accuracy and cybersecurity’ (European Commission, 2024, para. 4). 

In Ecuador, the proposed bill  “Proyecto de  Ley Orgánica de Regulación y Promoción de la Inteligencia Artificial en Ecuador” sets out a four-tier AI risk classification system, including a ban on extreme-risk systems and on the processing of personal data for purposes incompatible with human rights. The Bill proposes the requirement for public registries for high-risk AI applications (Asamblea Nacional, 2024). In China, the ”Ethical Norms for the New Generation of Artificial Intelligence” (2021) include requirements for the strengthening of risk monitoring systems, the establishment of user exit and feedback mechanisms (Ministry of Science and Technology of the People’s Republic of China, 2021). 

Principle 2: Safety and Security operationalised as Requirements for Technical Robustness and Contingency Plans

Plans must be in place to prevent and address unwanted harms (safety risks) and vulnerabilities to attacks (security risks) throughout the technology life cycle, thereby establishing sustainable, privacy-protective data frameworks for the training and validation of AI models (UNESCO, 2022, para. 27).

In the EU, high-risk AI systems require technical robustness and resilience plans to prevent harmful or undesirable behaviours that adversely affect fundamental rights. This includes fail-safe plans to interrupt the operation when anomalies exist (EU AI Act, 2024, Art. 15).  In Ecuador, the proposed bill  “Proyecto de  Ley Orgánica de Regulación y Promoción de la Inteligencia Artificial en Ecuador” (Asamblea Nacional, 2024, Art. 4d) includes mandates for rigorous tests, human rights impact assessments and safeguards against unintended use and adverse effects. Morocco’s national cybersecurity strategy requires regular penetration testing and intrusion detection systems to prevent harm from misuse or attacks (Hespress, 2025). In China, the ”Ethical Norms for the New Generation of Artificial Intelligence” requires AI systems to be verifiable, auditable, supervisable, traceable, predictable, trustworthy (Art 12), as well as tasks organisations to research and develop emergency mechanisms and loss compensation plans (Ministry of Science and Technology of the People’s Republic of China, 2021, Art 17). 

Principle 3: Right to Privacy and Data Protection operationalised as Adequate Personal Data Protection Measures

The use of AI systems must align with appropriate data protection and governance mechanisms for the collection, use, sharing, archiving and deletion of personal data.  In education, provisions must be in place to ensure that the use of AI supports learning without the extraction of sensitive information or the misuse, misappropriation or criminal exploitation of data collected in interactions with users (UNESCO 2022, para. 32, 33, 34 and 104). 

In Morocco, the General Secretariat of the Government is reviewing the “Digital X.0”, a draft framework law that will govern AI, data and digital identity, with three core priorities: data governance, digital identity and interoperability (Secrétariat Général du Gouvernement, 2025). Digital X.0 will overhaul the provisions of the existing personal data law09-08 (DGSSI, 2009). In Kazakhstan, the new “AI Law” ‘bans harmful practices such as behavioral manipulation, exploitation of vulnerabilities, emotion recognition without consent, social scoring and illegal data collection’ (Omirgazy, 2025a). In Sweden and Latvia, university policies prohibit uploading personal or copyrighted data to third-party AI tools, in accordance with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) requirements (KTH Royal Institute, 2025a; University of Latvia, 2024/2026).

Principle 4: Multi-stakeholder and Adaptive Governance & Collaboration operationalised as Multi-level Collaborative Governance Approaches and Mechanisms

Diverse stakeholders must be involved in governance of AI throughout the AI system life cycle, including governments, intergovernmental organisations, the technical community, civil society, researchers and academia, media, education, policy-makers, private sector, human rights institutions, anti-discrimination monitoring bodies and groups for youth and children. Measures must be in place to enable meaningful participation by marginalised groups, communities, and individuals, and to respect Indigenous Peoples’ self-governance of their data (UNESCO, 2022, para. 47).

The government of Kazakhstan engaged 13 state bodies in developing the first “AI law” to ensure the safe, transparent and ethical use of AI (Omarova, 2025). In Ecuador, the Ministry of Information and Telecommunications (MINTEL) proposed the creation of a collegiate entity with multisectoral representation and administrative independence to govern decisions on AI capability, data management and competitiveness (Albornoz & Gualavisi, 2025). In Morocco, in preparation for the “Draft Law 59.24 on Higher Education and Research”, the Ministry of Higher Education involved universities, research centres, regulatory bodies and NGOs in a coordinated, participatory, and flexible oversight of technology and the broader research ecosystem (Islah, 2025). The University of Los Andes and the Externado University in Colombia host multi-stakeholder roundtables on AI regulation with the participation of academia, civil society and government (University de los Andes, 2025). 

Principle 5: Responsibility and Accountability operationalised as Accountability and Liability Guidelines

The ethical responsibility and liability for decisions and actions based on an AI system should ultimately be attributable to AI actors, in proportion to their roles in the AI system’s lifecycle (UNESCO, 2022, para. 42). Oversight, impact assessments, audit, due diligence, and whistleblower protections must be in place to ensure accountability (para. 43). In learning, strict requirements for monitoring, assessing abilities and predicting learners’ behaviours must be in place (para. 104). Rigorous, independent, multidisciplinary scientific research must ensure a critical evaluation of AI research and proper monitoring of potential misuses or adverse effects (para. 110).

In China, the ”Ethical Norms for the New Generation of Artificial Intelligence”  prescribe that humans are the ultimately responsible entities and must ‘comprehensively heighten awareness of responsibility, and exercise self-reflection and self-discipline at every stage of the AI life cycle’ (Ministry of Science and Technology of the People’s Republic of China, 2021, Art. 3). In the UAE,  the “Charter for the Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence” (2024) defines accountability as a policy objective and the “UAE International Stance on AI Policy” (2024) emphasises the need for accountability mechanisms to address any potential violations in AI use (priority 2). 

In Kenya, Aga Khan University established GenAI guidelines to guide the transparent and responsible integration of AI tools into academic and administrative processes (Aga Khan University, 2023). In Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev University establishes the levels of responsibility for the integration of GenAI into learning and teaching, including response, position, acceptable use statements, dissemination, supervision and reporting (Nazarbayev University, 2023). In Latvia, the “Guidelines for the Use of AI in the University of Latvia” (2024, updated in 2026) define that authors of AI-assisted work ‘still are and remain responsible for the originality of content, truthfulness of the facts and validity of the statements’ (p. 8). In Colombia, Universidad de los Andes states that users bear the ‘responsibility to verify the pertinence, accuracy and veracity of the material generated by GenAI’ (Universidad de los Andes, 2024, section 2.2.1). 

Principle 6: Transparency and Explainability operationalised as Mandatory Disclosure and Contestability Frameworks

AI actors must ensure transparency and explainability as fundamental requirements for accountability and governance. AI systems must operate in ways that are traceable and understandable to those they affect, with disclosure of when and how systems are used, and with provisions to challenge decisions and outcomes that affect their safety or human rights (UNESCO, 2022, para. 37 – 41).

In China, the ”Ethical Norms for the New Generation of Artificial Intelligence” establish the obligation to improve transparency, explainability, understandability in the design, implementation and application of algorithms (Ministry of Science and Technology of the People’s Republic of China, 2021, Art. 12). In Morocco, AI processing of personal data is governed by the “Data Protection Law 09-08”  (CNDP, 2009) which grants citizens the right to seek recourse against automated decisions. CNDP holds hearings with scientific organisations to advance the implementation of the law (CNDP, 2025). 

In Kazakhstan, the guidelines of “Nazarbayev University’s Response to Generative Artificial Intelligence in Learning and Teaching” request faculty and students to disclose the use of AI tools and their details in the design, delivery and assessment of courses, as well as assignment completion (Nazarbayev University, 2023). In Sweden, KTH Royal Institute’s “GenAI Guidelines for studying with GenAI” encourage students to be transparent in whether, how and why students use the AI tools (KTH Royal Institute, 2025a). 

Principle 7: Human Oversight and Determination operationalised as Non-Negotiable Human Determination

Human oversight requires the attribution of ethical and legal responsibility at any stage of the AI lifecycle, as well as the provision of remedies to physical persons or existing legal entities. In cases where humans decide to rely on AI systems for efficacy, the decision to cede control remains with humans. AI systems can never replace ultimate human responsibility and accountability. Life-and-death decisions should not be ceded to AI systems (UNESCO, 2022, para. 35-36).

In the UAE, the “Charter for the Development and Use of AI” (2024) protects the ‘irreplaceable value of human judgment and human oversight over AI to correct any errors or biases that may arise’ (Principle 6). In China, the ”Ethical Norms for the New Generation of Artificial Intelligence” (2021) stipulate the principle of ‘strengthening responsibility’, whereby humans are the ultimate responsible party and should not avoid accountability review or evade responsibilities (Ministry of Science and Technology of the People’s Republic of China, 2021, Art 3). 

In Sweden, the “GenAI Guidelines for studying with GenAI” purposes at KTH Royal Institute establish the ‘human-in-the-loop’ principle whereby students are ‘responsible for all decisions and assessments of what is appropriate and correct’ (KTH Royal Institute, 2025a, Guideline 3), as well as human educators should be the final decision makers about the AI systems used in educational institutions (Jonkoping University, 2023).

Principle 8: Sustainability operationalised as Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) Alignment 

Continuous assessments of the human, social, cultural, economic and environmental impacts of AI technology must be in place, aligned with the evolving goals of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (UNESCO 2022, para. 31). Data, energy and resource-efficient AI methods must be prioritised. Should there be disproportionate “negative impacts on the environment, AI should not be used” (para. 86). Rigorous and independent scientific research that incorporates interdisciplinary perspectives beyond science, technology, engineering and mathematics must be ensured (UNESCO, 2022, para. 110). 

In Sweden, the KTH Royal Institute (2025b) provides resources on the energy consumption and ecological footprint of generative AI. In China, the discussion of AI and SDGs is active through academic research projects, conferences and reports (The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen, n.d.). In Colombia, the guidelines for the use of generative AI (“Lineamientos para el uso de inteligencia artificial generativa (IAG)”) at the University de los Andes stipulate that the use of GenAI must be coherent with and contribute to the SDGs (Universidad de los Andes, 2024). 

Principle 9: AI Awareness and Literacy operationalised as Transdisciplinary AI Literacy Initiatives

Governments, academia, civil society, media and the private sector must work jointly on accessible education, civic engagement and AI literacy initiatives so that members of society can make informed decisions and be protected from the undue influence of AI systems (para. 44). Learning must focus on the impact of AI on human rights and access to rights, as well as on the environment and ecosystems (para. 45). Pre-requisite skills for AI education must include an AI ethics curriculum (para. 101-102), aligned with national education programmes and traditions, developed in local and indigenous languages and accessible to persons with disabilities (para. 106) (UNESCO, 2022).

The “EU AI Act” requires AI literacy for providers and deployers (European Union, 2024, Art. 4). In the UAE, the “Charter for Development and Use of AI” (2024) stipulates as one of the priorities and key components the promotion of AI awareness (p. 11). In Morocco, “National Strategy “Digital Morocco 2030” invites scientists to ‘engage in multidisciplinary research (digital, legal, sociological, etc.) to reflect on the development of Al and its impact on society’, as well as ‘include digital education as early as primary school’ (Ministry of Digital Transition and Administrative Reform, Morocco, 2024, p. 12 – 13). The UAE Education, Human Development, and Community Development Council established a compulsory AI curriculum across K-12, with 25% of the content devoted to AI ethics (Rasheed, 2025).   Kazakhstan is integrating AI into national curricula at multiple levels (Omirgazy, 2025b). In Rwanda, the National AI Policy includes 21st-century skills and high-level literacy as enablers of the strategy (Republic of Rwanda, Ministry of ICT and Innovation, 2022). Public AI literacy is a key element of Kenya’s national AI strategy (Kenya AI Strategy 2025 – 2030). 

Tsinghua University in China launched an internal AI Literacy website that focuses on the fundamentals and applications of generative AI in teaching and learning, with a dedicated section on the “Responsible Use of Generative AI” with key principles for academic and ethical practice (Tsinghua University, 2025). In the United States, the State Council for Higher Education in Virginia (SCHEV) awarded a grant to a consortium led by Virginia State University, a historically Black institution, Northern Virginia Community College, a major community college, and Brightpoint Community College, to expand AI instruction in dual-enrollment and transfer-pathway programmes. The programme includes AI micro-credentials for professional advancement and open educational resources for wider use across the state’s higher education sector (Northern Virginia Community College, 2025; Virginia State University, 2025). 

Principle 10: Fairness and Non-Discrimination Operationalised as Ex-ante Human Rights Impact Assessments and Remediation

AI actors must promote social justice and safeguard fairness and non-discrimination in line with international law. Inclusive approaches in AI development must consider the specific needs of diverse constituencies to the benefits of AI, regardless of race, colour, gender, age, disability or other grounds. AI actors must make all reasonable efforts to minimise and avoid reinforcing discriminatory or biased applications and outcomes and ensure effective remedies against algorithmic harms (UNESCO, 2022, para. 28-30).

The “African Union Continental Strategy” includes plans for legal protection against algorithmic bias and discrimination, including the need to ‘compensate for bias and discrimination’ (p. 21-22). Member States committed to develop and roll-out AI assessments including the UNESCO Ethical Impact Assessment (EIA) (African Union, Continental AI Strategy, 2024). In Ecuador, the draft bill “Proyecto de  Ley Orgánica de Regulación y Promoción de la Inteligencia Artificial en Ecuador”, proposes the prohibition of algorithmic discrimination against vulnerable groups and historically disadvantaged groups (Asamblea Nacional, 2024, Art. 4b and 29). In Morocco, ethical risk-assessment mechanisms aligned with the UNESCO Recommendation and the “EU AI Act”, will be part of the national AI roadmap announced by the Ministry of Digital Transition and Administrative Reform (Amer, 2025).

Ethical impact assessments are recommended by the University of Latvia, before the adoption of AI-enabled products, to protect users against manipulation and embedded biases (University of Latvia, 2024/2026). In the United States, the Center for Responsible AI (CRAI) at Virginia State University, focuses on the ethical adoption of AI to ensure that ‘AI amplifies opportunity and inclusion, not division’ (n.d.). 

Recommendations

Building on the policy analysis above, in this section we offer five recommendations for policymakers and higher education stakeholders. They are grounded in the Recommendation. The aim is to translate high-profile principles into practice with consideration that ethical AI in higher education has to be both globally informed and locally relevant.

1) Adopt human rights-based AI frameworks with clearly defined red lines. We encourage policymakers to align national or regional frameworks with international human rights standards, and universities to provide clear guidance on the classification of the educational uses of AI tools according to levels of risk. Higher education stakeholders can implement this through institutional risk registers, ethical impact assessments and responsible procurement processes. It is important to ensure that no AI system is adopted without adequate human oversight or harm prevention mechanisms. These measures should be linked to HEIs accreditation standards and public reporting requirements. Universities can look for existing templates and guidance for institutional self-assessment for responsible AI adoption (AI Policy Lab, Umea University, 2025; UNESCO, 2023).

2) Maintain responsible data governance and privacy by design. Protecting personal and sensitive information must be a non-negotiable foundation of any ethical AI policy in higher education. Policymakers should update national privacy guidance for education. It should guarantee that the privacy protection mechanisms go beyond legal compliance. Universities should prohibit the entry of personal or copyrighted data into third-party AI tools unless approved and secure. They should also carry out data protection impact assessments for high-risk AI systems used in teaching, assessment and administrative functions. Additionally, HEIs need to promote secure internal tools, train staff and students on privacy and maintain transparency on how data are collected, stored and deleted. 

3) Reinforce human oversight, transparency and accountability. All high-stakes AI-assisted decisions, including admissions, grading or disciplinary procedures should be subject to human review. Students and staff must be informed when AI tools are used and have the right to contest and request explanations for decisions affecting them. Institutions can lead by example of transparency by publishing databases of the AI systems they use, including information about their purpose, model design and safeguards. 

4) Make digital literacy, including AI literacy, universal and contextual across disciplines. AI literacy should not be limited to computer science but embedded in all programmes with an emphasis on critical thinking, ethics, data protection and the psychological effects of AI on learning and mental health. This requires coordinated policy support to fund educator training, micro-credentials and professional development programmes. Universities should design curricula that integrate AI ethics and responsible innovation into existing courses. It is important to stimulate educational stakeholders to learn to question, interpret and responsibly use AI outputs. 

5) Conduct ethical procurement and evaluation of AI systems throughout the AI lifecycle. Procurement offices should act as gatekeepers of trustworthy AI systems, conducting ethical impact assessments before purchase and throughout the use (Hickok, 2024; UNESCO, 2023). Contracts with AI vendors should include transparency, access and termination clauses. It is important that institutions can discontinue systems that no longer meet ethical standards or where human oversight is impossible. National and regional policymakers can strengthen this process by tying funding and accreditation to proof of ethical procurement and periodic evaluation.

Conclusion

AI tools in higher education cannot be ethical unless users understand how to use them, institutions set clear expectations (guidelines), enforce and monitor them, as well as governments support capacity building in educational settings. This requires both top-down (government legislation and technical support) and bottom-up (institutional action) approaches. For example, using ethical impact assessments before purchasing AI tools, as well as shared agency among faculty, administrators, students and community partners. Ethical AI in higher education must be inclusive, adaptive and globally informed, but locally grounded.

Acknowledgements. This policy brief was produced under the United Nations Higher Education Sustainability Initiative (HESI) as part of the Implementation Group (IG) on “AI Ethics, Safety, and Inclusivity in Higher Education”. The authors appreciate the support of Ms Arianna Valentini and Lily Liu Bosen. The research findings in this policy brief reflect the work of the authors named above. They do not represent the opinion or position of any other organisation, including the United Nations. 

 

References: 

African Union. 2024, July 20. Continental Artificial Intelligence Strategy. Harnessing AI for Africa’s Development and Prosperity. Available at: https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/44004-doc-EN-_Continental_AI_Strategy_July_2024.pdf (Accessed: 19 December 2025)

‌Aga Khan University. 2023. The Use of Generative AI in Higher Education at AKU (Draft Guidelines). (n.d.). Available at: https://www.aku.edu/admissions/Documents/policy-use-of-generative-ai.pdf (Accessed: 19 December 2025)

Albornoz, M. B. and Gualavisi, A. Dictamen Técnico sobre la Política Gubernamental aprobada por MINTEL. [Technical Assessment about the Government Policy approved by MINTEL]. Available at: https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000394822 (in Spanish) (Accessed: 20 December 2025)

Amer, O. M. 2025, Dec. Morocco Accelerates AI Strategy with New Regulations, JAZARI Institutes and Sovereign Cloud Push. Available at https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2025/12/271574/morocco-accelerates-ai-strategy-with-new-regulations-jazari-institutes-and-sovereign-cloud-push (Accessed: 6 January 2026) 

American Association of University Professors (AAUP). 2025. Artificial Intelligence and Academic Professions. Available at https://www.aaup.org/reports-publications/aaup-policies-reports/topical-reports/artificial-intelligence-and-academic (Accessed: 8 October 2025)

Asamblea Nacional República del Ecuador. 2024, June 20. Proyecto de Ley Orgánica de Regulación y Promoción de la IA en Ecuador. [Draft Organic Law for the Regulation and Promotion of AI in Ecuador]. Available at: https://www.asambleanacional.gob.ec/ (in Spanish) (Accessed: 19 December 2025)

Bozkurt, A., Xiao, J., Farrow, R., Bai, J.Y., Nerantzi, C., Moore, S., Dron, J., Stracke, C.M., Singh, L., Crompton, H. Koutropoulos, A. and others. 2024. The manifesto for teaching and learning in a time of generative AI: A critical collective stance to better navigate the future. Open Praxis, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 487-513. https://search.informit.org/doi/pdf/10.3316/informit.T2025011300014191575969861

Center for AI & Digital Policy (CAIDP). 2026. AI and Democratic Values (CAIDP Index) 2026. Available at https://www.caidp.org/reports/caidp-index-2026/ (Accessed: 17 August 2026)

Commission Nationale de Contrôle de la Protection des Données à Caractère Personnel (CNDP). 2025. Communiqué : IA et protection des données à caractère personnel. Available at: https://www.cndp.ma/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/CNDP-Communique-IA-et-protection-des-donnees-a-caractere-personnel-FR.pdf (in French) (Accessed: 19 December 2025)

Commission Nationale de Contrôle de la Protection des Données à Caractère Personnel (CNDP). 2009. Loi n° 09-08 relative à la protection des personnes physiques à l’égard du traitement des données à caractère personnel [Law No. 09-08 relating to the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data.]. Available at https://www.cndp.ma/loi-09-08/ (in French) (Accessed: 19 December 2025)

General Directorate of Information Systems Security (DGSSI). 2009. Loi n° 09-08 relative à la protection des personnes physiques à l’égard du traitement des données à caractère personnel [Law No. 09-08 relating to the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data]. Available at: https://www.dgssi.gov.ma/fr/loi-09-08-relative-la-protection-des-personnes-physiques-legard-du-traitement-des  (in French) (Accessed: 19 December 2025)

Government of the UAE. 2024, June 10. UAE Charter for the Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence. UAE Legislation. Available at: https://uaelegislation.gov.ae/en/policy/details/the-uae-charter-for-the-development-and-use-of-artificial-intelligence (Accessed: 19 December 2025)

Government of the UAE. 2024, September 2. UAE’s International Stance on Artificial Intelligence Policy. UAE Legislation. Available at: https://uaelegislation.gov.ae/en/policy/details/uae-s-international-stance-on-artificial-intelligence-policy (Accessed: 19 December 2025)

Grūzītis, N., Skadiņa, I., Baranova, S. and Nerenberga, J.  Updated in 2026, January. The Guidelines for the Use of Artificial Intelligence at the University of Latvia.  University of Latvia. Available at: https://www.lu.lv/fileadmin/user_upload/LU.LV/www.lu.lv/Studijas/guidelines_for_
AI_use_at_UL_study_process_2026.pdf
(Accessed: 17 August 2026)

Hespress. 2025, April 29. Morocco doubles down on cybersecurity and AI as digital push gains speed. Available at: https://en.hespress.com/109307-morocco-doubles-down-on-cybersecurity-and-ai-as-digital-push-gains-speed.html  (Accessed: 19 December 2025)

Hickok, M. 2024. Public procurement of artificial intelligence systems: new risks and future proofing. AI & Society, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp.1213-1227. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00146-022-01572-2 

European Commission, Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture. 2022. Ethical guidelines on the use of artificial intelligence (AI) and data in teaching and learning for educators. Publications Office of the European Union. Available at: https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2766/153756 (Accessed: 15 October 2025)

European Commission. 2024. European Artificial Intelligence Act comes into force. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_4123 (Accessed: 15 October 2025)

European Union. 2024. ‌ Artificial Intelligence Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689), Official Journal of the European Union. Version of 13 June 2024. Interinstitutional File: 2021/0106(COD). Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj  (Accessed: 19 December 2025)

Islah, S. 2025. Enseignement supérieur : El Midaoui fait le point sur les nouveautés, les chantiers et les défis de l’Université. [Higher education: El Midaoui provides an update on the latest developments, projects, and challenges facing the University].  Le Matin. Available at: https://lematin.ma/enseignement/nouveautes-2025-2026-de-lenseignement-superieur/314556 (in French) (Accessed: 19 December 2025)

Jonkoping University, 2023, June 19. Artificial Intelligence Ethical Guidelines. Available at: https://ju.se/portal/educate/en/guides/artificial-intelligence/ethical-guidelines.html  (Accessed: 19 December 2025)

Kenya Ministry of Information, Communications and the Digital Economy. 2025, March. Kenya AI Strategy 2025 – 2030. Available at: https://ict.go.ke/sites/default/files/2025-03/Kenya%20AI%20Strategy%202025%20-%202030.pdf (Accessed: 19 December 2025)

Kingdom of Morocco. Ministry of Digital Transition and Administrative Reform (MMSP). 2024. National Startegy “Digital Morocco 2030”. Available at: https://www.mmsp.gov.ma/sites/default/files/2024-09/PlaquetteInstitutionnel_18092024_Ang.pdf (Accessed: 19 December 2025)

KTH Royal Institute of Technology. 2025a, June 24. Considerations for studying with generative AI. Available at: https://www.kth.se/en/student/studier/kurs/generativ-ai/avvagningar-1.1410997 (Accessed: 19 December 2025)

KTH Royal Institute of Technology. 2026, July 17. Generative AI in higher education. Available at: https://intra.kth.se/en/utbildning/systemstod/generativ-ai/oversikt-1.1253698  (Accessed: 17 August 2026)

KTH Royal Institute of Technology. 2025b, April 10. AI and Sustainability- Towards a Fair Future. Documentation from Lunch’n’ Learn. Available at: https://intra.kth.se/en/utbildning/e-larande/e-larande-nyheter/ai-och-hallbarhet-mot-en-rattvis-framtid-1.1398761 (Accessed: 22 December 2025)

Miao, F. and Holmes, W. 2023. Guidance for generative AI in education and research. UNESCO.  Available at: https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000386693  (Accessed: 19 December 2025)

‌Ministry of Science and Technology of the People’s Republic of China. 2021. 《新一代人工智能伦理规范》发布. [Ethical Norms for the New Generation of Artificial Intelligence].  Available at:  http://www.most.gov.cn/kjbgz/202109/t20210926_177063.html  (in Chinese Mandarin) (Accessed: 19 December 2025)

Nazarbayev University. Nazarbayev University’s Response to Generative Artificial Intelligence in Learning and Teaching. 2023. The Center of Innovation in Learning and Teaching Office of the Provost. Available at: https://regulations.nu.edu.kz/bitstream/123456789/1030/1/NU%20Response%20to%20
Integrating%20Generative%20AI%20into%20Learning%20%26%20Teaching.pdf#page=3.08

(Accessed: 19 December 2025)

Northern Virginia Community College (NOVA). 2025, February 21. NOVA Collaborates on Computer Science Pathway with an AI Focus. Available at: https://www.nvcc.edu/about/news/featured-articles/2025/AI-grant-computer-science.html (Accessed: 19 December 2025)

OECD. 2024. The Potential Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Equity and Inclusion in Education. OECD Artificial Intelligence Papers. No. 23. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/08/the-potential-impact-of-artificial-intelligence-on-equity-and-inclusion-in-education_0d7e9e00/15df715b-en.pdf (Accessed: 15 November 2025)

Omarova, Z. 2025, April 8. Kazakhstan Seeks to Attract 10,000 AI Specialists Annually. The Astana Times. Available at: https://astanatimes.com/2025/04/kazakhstan-seeks-to-attract-10000-ai-specialists-annually/ (Accessed: 19 December 2025)

Omirgazy, D. 2025a, November 17. Kazakhstan Adopts Central Asia’s First AI Law. The Astana Times. Available at: https://astanatimes.com/2025/11/kazakhstan-adopts-central-asias-first-ai-law/ (Accessed: 19 December 2025)

Omirgazy, D. 2025b, September 18. Kazakhstan Establishes National Standards for Artificial Intelligence in Education. Available at: https://astanatimes.com/2025/09/kazakhstan-establishes-national-standards-for-artificial-intelligence-in-education (Accessed: 19 December 2025)

Rasheed, A. 2025, August 23. UAE schools to introduce AI curriculum in new academic year. Available at: https://gulfnews.com/uae/education/uae-schools-to-introduce-ai-curriculum-in-new-academic-year-1.500242831 (Accessed: 19 December 2025)

Republic of Rwanda. Ministry of ICT & Innovation (MICT). 2022. The National AI Policy. Available at: https://www.minict.gov.rw/fileadmin/user_upload/minict_user_upload/Documents/Policies/
Artificial_Intelligence_Policy.pdf
(Accessed: 19 December 2025)

Riga Stradins University. 2024. Artificial Intelligence in Higher Education Guidelines [English version]. Available at: https://www.rsu.lv/en/artificial-intelligence-higher-education  (Accessed: 19 December 2025) 

Secrétariat Général du Gouvernement (SGG). 2025, November 8. Journal de la semaine du 03 novembre 2025: Actualités nationales du numérique [Journal of the week of November 3, 2025: National digital news]. Available at: https://www.sgg.gov.ma/Portals/1/veille_juridique/actualite_numerique/aj_03112025.pdf (Accessed: 19 December 2025)

‌The Chinese University of Hong Kong in Shenzhen (n.d.). AI与可持续发展展望. [AI and Sustainable Development Outlook]. Available at: https://www.zhaojunhua.org/reports/AI_SUSTAINABLE_DEVELOPMENT_OUTLOOK_ZH.pdf (in Chinese Mandarin) (Accessed: 19 December 2025)

Titareva T., Tucker J., Carli R., Movchan V., Dignum V. 2026. Question Zero: Why Responsible AI Begins Before AI Adoption. AI Policy Exchange Forum (AIPEX). Available at: https://aipolicylab.se/aipex-contributions/question-zero-why-responsible-ai-begins-before-ai-adoption/ (Accessed: 17 August 2026)

Tsignhua University. 2025. Responsible Use of Generative AI. Available at: https://yuketang.tsinghua.edu.cn/ai/learning-center?selectNodeIds=60876,60878 (for internal use only). (Accessed: 19 December 2025)

‌UNESCO (n.d.). A human rights approach to AI. Ten core principles lay out a human-rights-centred approach to the Ethics of AI. Available at: https://www.unesco.org/en/artificial-intelligence/recommendation-ethics (Accessed: 19 December 2025)

UNESCO. 2022. Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence. Available at: https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000381137 (Accessed: 19 December 2025)

UNESCO. 2023. Ethical impact assessment: a tool of the Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence. Available at:  https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000386276 (Accessed: 19 December 2025)

UNESCO. 2025. AI and Education: Protecting the Rights of Learners. Available at: https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000395373 (Accessed: 19 December 2025)

Universidad de los Andes. 2024, October. Lineamientos para el uso de inteligencia artificial generativa (IAG) en la Universidad de los Andes. [Guidelines for the use of generative artificial intelligence (GAI) at the University of the Andes]. Available at: https://secretariageneral.uniandes.edu.co/images/documents/lineamientos-uso-inteligencia-artificial-generativa-IAG-uniandes.pdf (in Spanish) (Accessed: 19 December 2025)

Universidad de los Andes. 2025, August. El futuro del trabajo en Colombia en la era de la IA: hallazgos de la décima mesa multiactor sobre regulación de la IA. [Future of Work in Colombia in the AI era. Findings of the 10th Multi-stakeholder roundtable about AI regulation]. Available at: https://gobierno.uniandes.edu.co/el-futuro-del-trabajo-en-colombia-en-la-era-de-la-ia-hallazgos-de-la-decima-mesa-multiactor-sobre-regulacion-de-la-ia/ (Accessed: 19 December 2025)

Virginia State University (VSU). 2025, September 30. Virginia State University Awarded $2 Million Grant From Thurgood Marshall College Fund For AI-Enabled Digital Transformation.  Available at: https://www.vsu.edu/news/2025/vsu-awarded-tmcf-ai.php (Accessed: 19 December 2025)

Virginia State University. (n.d.). Center for Responsible AI (CRAI). Available at https://www.vsu.edu/about/leadership/vp-for-academic-affairs/crai/ (Accessed: 20 December 2025)

World Bank (2024). Global Trends in AI Governance. Available at: https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099120224205026271/pdf/P1786161ad76ca0ae
1ba3b1558ca4ff88ba.pdf
(Accessed: 19 December 2025)

 

AI data labelling: a pathway or peril to refugee self-reliance?

Executive summary

Humanitarian budgets are collapsing at the same moment that AI systems are generating major demand for high-quality human-labelled data. Considering flexibility and low entry requirements of AI data labelling, social enterprises have moved quickly to position refugees at this intersection, framing this digital work as a scalable, dignified pathway to economic self-reliance. Drawing on organisational documents, social enterprise impact reports, and first-hand worker testimonies, the policy brief examines whether data labelling constitutes a meaningful livelihood solution for displaced populations or whether it reproduces new forms of digital precarity within global AI supply chains.

The analysis focuses on four interrelated dynamics: the dual identity of social enterprises, which pitch their impact-oriented services to tech clients while selling the same work as empowerment to humanitarian donors; the self-reliance narrative promoted by social enterprises; and the lived realities behind this narrative, including both the positive aspects of giving refugees access to AI work and structural labour harms embedded in this labour.  While social enterprises are providing hope and some insulation for refugees entering the labelling market, they cannot overcome structural harms of the market, leaving refugees to bear the cost of that failure. This paper recommends that UNHCR publish binding operational guidelines for social enterprises, drawing on the Fairwork Framework, to ensure that AI-related digital work can support refugee livelihoods without entrenching the very exploitation it claims to address.

1. Context

Global emergencies are intensifying: the number of state-based armed conflicts reached a 70-year record in 2024 – numbering 61 (PRIO 2025). At the same time, global warming neared a 1.3 anthropogenic increase (World Weather Attribution 2025), and authoritarian repressions keep rising under the flag of a right-wing turn (Human Rights Watch 2024), leading to growing displacement all over the world. Despite this increasing polycrisis, in 2025 UNHCR’s budgets have diminished by 30% year to year and are expected to further fall by 15% in 2026 (Le Poidevin 2026). The greatest impact of these shortfalls has been felt on refugees themselves, whose numbers soared to over 36 million in 2025 (UNHCR n.d.).

By 2023, two-thirds of refugees lived in poverty, and 62% resided in host countries that severely restrict labour market access in practice, (UNHCR 2023, 1) despite the 1951 Refugee Convention’s formal guarantee of the right to work. The International Labour Organization (ILO) thus framed the gig economy as a “stepping stone to jobs and income”, (ILO 2025a, 19) while UNHCR highlights that web-based economic activities afford displaced individuals the vital opportunity to earn a living (Easton-Calabria, Hackl 2023, 7). In 2022 UNHCR and ILO launched an 18-month project in 8 countries called “Promotion, Inclusion and Protection of Refugees in the Gig Economy,” aiming to equip displaced populations with new skills and knowledge connected to digital hygiene and cyber risks (ILO n.d.).

Remote digital work like AI data labelling is thus uniquely attractive because it bypasses physical borders and discriminatory national labour laws, offering low barriers to entry and flexible, piece-rate work (Clark 2021, 770). For displaced populations, it theoretically offers a “virtual entry” into the global workforce, presenting an immediate income path for those routinely blocked from stable, local jobs (Altenried 2024, 1120). For tech companies, this transnational digital matching grants access to an “extremely scalable workforce” on a “pay-as-you-go” basis (De Stefano 2016, 4-5).

2. The hidden infrastructure of AI: what data labelling is

“AI isn’t magic; it’s a pyramid scheme of human labour” – Adio Dinika, a researcher at the Distributed AI Research Institute explained to The Guardian (Bansla 2025). AI market has been rapidly expanding with UNCTAD projecting for it to grow by 25 times – from 189 billion to 4.8 trillion USD between 2023 to 2033 (UNCTAD 2025). Microsoft estimated that one in six people are using generative AI worldwide with Global North leading the way with almost a quarter of the population being GenAI users (Microsoft 2026, 2). Its major branches like large language models (LLMs), developed for chatbots like ChatGPT, and computer vision systems, used to identify objects in self-driving cars, require massive amounts of high-quality data. If AI is trained on raw, unlabelled data, it absorbs inaccurate and different in format information, ruining its output (Jenkins 2024). To prevent a drop in quality, tech giants rely on millions of human data labellers, who are important for teaching AI systems to do tasks that are hard to describe clearly, such as finding emotions or bias in text (CWA Union 2025). These workers draw boxes around objects in images, transcribe audio, tag particular words and mistakes in AI-generated text and review datasets to ensure consistency and accuracy (SuperAnnotate 2025). Labelling is quite easy to complete and only requires language knowledge (often non-English languages on a native level), basic computer literacy and common sense (Kaneti 2025, 611).

3. The social enterprise model and its self-reliance pitch

Social enterprises entered the humanitarian sector in 2010-s, offering humanitarian agencies a mechanism to embrace market logics while maintaining moral legitimacy (Portales 2019, 57). By presenting themselves as hybrid entities that combine the efficiency and innovation of for-profit businesses with the passion and values of non-profits, they now act as a “bridge” between these two worlds, creating a “blended value” that appeals to both corporate clients and humanitarian donors (Battisti 2019, 140).

3.1 Hybrid structure and promise of social enterprises

If anyone visits the website of a social enterprise with AI data labelling programs, they find a platform created to speak to two entirely different worlds simultaneously. To tech giants, mostly based in the Global North, the enterprise pitches seamless, high-quality data labelling services at competitive rates, promising to build the future of AI. To humanitarian donors and foundations the pitch is more about resilience and showing refugees economically and mentally benefiting by entering the global digital economy.[i] To succeed in disseminating both pitches, social enterprises make their whole structure hybrid. The first half is a commercial agency that targets corporate tech contracts, showing they can successfully work in a private setting. The second one is a non-profit foundation that benefits from tax reductions and charity donors that give out grants specifically to NGOs. It is responsible for the social mission part and takes on digital literacy training and providing infrastructure, like laptops, to their refugee workers.[ii]

By utilizing these two faces, the social enterprise positions itself as a cushion between the client AI data labelling platform and refugees. However, the main website page of the corporate agency of EmpowerAI does not make major emphasis on datasets being produced by refugees: the visitor would need to scroll and click to learn about this.[iii] The reason behind it is that the social impact pitch is deemed unattractive to corporate clients that are “accustomed to no compensation floor and thriving on a rampant race to the bottom”. When one enterprise tried to establish stricter rules on fair compensation, they faced so many difficulties in getting new clients that the hired consultants recommended it to “tone it [social impact narrative] down” (Kaneti 2025, 618, 620).

3.2 Selling “self-reliance” to the market and the worker

The narrative of self-reliance has been present in refugee support field, being grounded by UNHCR in their 2005 “Handbook of Self-Reliance”, aiming to empower refugees “to meet essential needs <…> in a sustainable manner and with dignity” (UNHCR 2005, 1) It has later become a running theme in most social enterprise reports under an umbrella narrative of “work instead of aid” (Sama 2022, 12). They set an inspiring tone by making the title “Empowering Change in Conflict-Affected Communities” and featuring “inspiring case studies” that “captured positive changes our initiatives brought to communities in need” (Humans in the Loop 2024, 1). Social enterprise operations are thus driven by a goal of “economic self-sufficiency of disadvantaged populations,” while a longer-term vision is “refugees [being] able to overcome economic & social barriers and become pioneers in the tech sector” (Subul 2024, 10-11). Here social enterprises reframe refugees from “tech user[s] to tech empowered,” (Techfugees n.d.) actively promoting a narrative change of the role refugees can play in digital economy. Considering the ambition, the effects are supposedly going beyond giving short-term solutions, instead aspiring to provide “financial independence and career development”, serving as an opportunity to “re-start their careers” (Humans in the Loop 2024, 3). However, analysed social impact reports provide no longitudinal data on whether participants transition to stable employment. Instead, it highlights “success stories” of workers who leveraged their annotation gigs with the only “ripple effect” being that participating refugees started “investing more into their families, education and communities after securing digital work” (Sama 2022, 24).

4. The realities of AI data labelling programs for refugees

To understand how social enterprises succeed or fail in fulfilling their promise of self-reliance to refugees, it is necessary to consider both the bright and the dark side of AI data labelling programs.

4.1 The bright(-er) side of data labelling

Hope given through market access

As it was mentioned above, in many host countries displaced people routinely confront obstacles, including the denial of work permits, unrecognized educational credentials, language barriers, widespread discrimination and geographic isolation in camps or peripheral urban areas (Altenried 2024, 1120). Hence, AI data labelling can give much-needed accessibility to income that does not necessarily require a 9-5 office presence. It makes it accessible to refugees caring for families, those with physical or mental disabilities or facing religious restrictions on mixed-gender workplaces (CWA Union 2025). Another benefit is transportability of data labelling work as regardless of refugee’s next destination, it will still be available online, which is a ray of stability important for ever-changing livelihood of displaced people (De Stefano 2015, 5). Moreover, from the psychological perspective, earning money independent of social allowance can in itself be empowering with refugees feeling “on top of the world” when they first got it (Berhane Gebrekidan 2024, 7). A job in a prospective field of AI serves as motivation and a point of pride for people who lost their homes and had to restart their lives in a new country.

Social enterprise mediation

Importantly, social enterprise model offers an additional insulation for refugees that would otherwise be thrown into the ocean of data labelling work without any safety nets. Refugees are usually unaware about how to register and engage on digital platforms or do not even possess the needed infrastructure (Kaneti 2025, 616). Most social enterprises are at least trying to negotiate better conditions for their workers, for instance, setting fairer pricing models, arranging clearer task scopes and deadlines, and implementing specific ethical guidelines (Ibid, 615). They are also taking on most of the administrative burden: finding clients and negotiating connection with refugees in spite of their documentary situation. This support is especially vital for refugees who often lack official documents or bank accounts due to host state restrictions and other bureaucratic obstacles. So, social enterprises focus on mediating bank transfers from the clients, which refugees themselves call “very convenient”. While it might take some time: “We sometimes do not receive our work allowances until after two months” (Al-Hammada 2024, 11), this is still much better than not receiving anything at all. In case of office work in host countries, social enterprises can also offer the space and infrastructure (computers, Wi-Fi etc.) needed for data labelling. Finally, as mentioned above, they are conducting trainings that go beyond data labelling, important for those without education, computer or soft skills, which can thus improve refugees’ employability and future work opportunities.[iv]

4.2 The dark side of AI data labelling for refugees

Non-transparency and communication hurdles

When a refugee starts work on the first project, the enterprise gives instructions from the client. They are individual for each project and can be 30-40 pages which workers must learn to avoid mistakes. However, workers have no direct line to the client, so any unclear cases are communicated back through a long chain: enterprise team manager to senior staff to client (Ibid, 9). This layered communication frequently produces misalignment between what the written policy says, what the trainer explained, and what the client actually wanted. The consequences then fall on refugees. When a completed and submitted project fails to meet client expectations, workers are expected to redo the work under revised guidelines, importantly doing it for free. As one Syrian refugee data worker in Lebanon put it: “Why do we have to show flexibility and re-implement the work even though it is not our fault, as the instructions were not clear from the beginning? Is it fair to work twice on a project for one wage?” (Ibid, 10).

Non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) remain an issue for most data labellers as well, as they are forced to sign these documents to formally protect data of the client company. NDAs function as instruments of forced silence and intimidation, making it punishable to form unions to try improving working conditions of labellers. While some social enterprises are trying to take on more advocacy functions and negotiate the unionization of workers, it remains extremely difficult due to clients justifying NDAs as necessary to protect their intellectual property and corporate confidentiality (Equidem 2025, 42).

Algorithmic control and NDAs

The mental strain of meeting targets is serious – in most projects the lowest quality threshold stands at 90-97% (al-Hammada 2024, 7). A score below this could trigger warnings, lost incentives or even placement on a “performance improvement plan,” which workers described less as support than as a formal corridor toward dismissal (Berhane Gebrekidan 2024). To make matters worse, workers might have to face triggering text or pictures, often connected to their war-torn homelands, as they are often hired to label in their native language. While most times social enterprises are trying to avoid such projects, they are often left unaware about concrete tasks and end goals of their clients (Kaneti 2025, 617). “I hope this isn’t for weapons” is a valid concern among labellers, however the non-transparency of end client makes it impossible to be certain about the usage of labelled data. It might indeed be for weapons (Miceli 2024).

The time pressure remains massive as well. If the worker takes too much time on a task, their rating will fall, resulting in less or lower-paid tasks in the future (Hao, Hernandez 2022). It leaves them in a vicious cycle of trying to complete tasks fast but retain the highest quality. One data worker summarized this pressure: “How can you read this essay, grade it accurately, and then provide feedback in five minutes? The time per task was not adding up, and then the timer put on pressure” (CWA Union 2025). This is usually the point that clients of social enterprises are not willing to negotiate on, as famously said: “time is money,” and the labelled datasets are expected by the company on time, regardless of how much work and rework it actually requires (al-Hammada 2024, 7).

Psychological effects

In an attempt to mitigate negative effects on workers, most social enterprises introduce wellness breaks and support sessions with a psychologist. Despite flexibility being one of the appeals of this work, in reality, those working in the office have a standard 8-hour day and highly restricted wellness breaks. Workers in similar facilities reported having just “a 20-minute wellness break twice a week” and noted that they “have to beg for a wellness break on the group chat for it to be granted” (Berhane Gebrekidan 2024, 14). Psychological support is also unprofessional. Instead of receiving help, workers state: “I always go to the counsellors and come out more triggered and more crazy” because some counsellors “think you are faking it or trying to manipulate them so you can get a leave permit when you cry” (Ibid, 32-33).

Economic precarity and dependence in the absence of choice

When there is “only one project every few months <…> Many annotators feel compelled to accept any available work” (al-Hammada 2024, 32-33) The task can also come in the middle of the night or when they are unavailable. Some workers resort to using a “browser extension that sounds an alarm when a new task appears” and keep it “on loud even when [they] sleep, to wake [them] up in the middle of the night” (Hao, Hernandez 2022). However, this additional payment may be fundamental for the whole family, so missing or declining it is not an option. Yet this work is still poorly paid. Labelling objects on 10,000 images over several days is compensated with just 140 euros – an amount that barely covers ten days of food in a country like Lebanon (al-Hammada 2024, 9). In a year the “salary”, already positively negotiated by one data labelling social enterprise, amounted to just a bit above 2000 euro (Kaneti 2025, 615), which is far from enough for survival of even one person.

Non-transferable skills

Finally, the long-term effects of trainings conducted by social enterprises for refugees might not be as useful as promoted. Instead of acquiring high-level coding or web development skills that foster genuine upward mobility, the social enterprise only taps into these spheres on a surface level, primarily focusing on training refugees to carry out routine, low-skill microwork. The trainings range from turning on a computer to English language or soft skills, however they rarely go into developing any of these skills higher than pre-intermediate level (Humans in the Loop 2025, 15). While this is important for some displaced data labellers, many other are not only literate but also have a higher education (al-Hammada 2024, 8). Transferability of these skills thus remains doubtful, trapping refugees in the cage of labelling microtasks for specific clients who have narrow rules and skills needed for usually short-term projects.

5. International policy landscape: Emerging good practices

The regulatory vacuum that historically enabled these harms is beginning to fill. The following instruments constitute a growing toolkit that UNHCR can leverage in its frameworks for refugee platform work. These examples were chosen to represent relevant policies in different regions and are not meant to cover the entire regulatory landscape of platform work and are listed by scale of coverage.

Who introduced Measure / Instrument Relevance for Refugee Contexts
ILO Convention concerning decent work in the platform economy, ILC.114/Convention No. 193: recognizes workers’ rights to decent labour and occupational health and safety; requires human involvement in algorithmic management changes; mandates disclosure of monitoring and decision-making systems; classifies workers based on the terms of their work  (ILO 2026). Provides UNHCR with a multilateral standard to cite in partnership negotiations and advocate for in UN digital governance fora.
EU Platform Work Directive 2024/2831 (EUR-LEX 2024): mandates employment status clarification, algorithmic transparency, human oversight of automated decisions and worker representative consultation. Directly applicable to BPO and platform-mediated data work. Creates enforceable transparency standards UNHCR can require of EU-headquartered partners.
Malaysia Gig Workers Act 2025 (Malaysia Parliament 2025): national legal framework regulating digital platform workers; prohibits unfair wage deductions, mandates payment transparency, ensures algorithmic transparency, introduces occupational safety requirements and creates a grievance tribunal (ILO 2025c). First comprehensive national gig worker law in Southeast Asia. Provides a model for host-country advocacy in regions where UNHCR has operational presence.
Australia Fair Work (Digital Labour Platform Deactivation Code) 2024 (Department of Employment and Workplace Relations 2024): minimum standards for worker deactivations; requires warning notices, opportunity to respond, review processes, and record-keeping. Applies to all “regulated workers” on digital platforms (ILO 2024). Addresses the arbitrary termination dynamic documented in refugee data labelling contexts. Model for NDA-alternative grievance pathways.
India (Bihar) Bihar Platform Based Gig Workers (Registration, Safety and Welfare) Act 2025 (PRS 2025): Welfare Board, Social Security Fund, registration, payment regulation, data protection, algorithmic transparency, grievance redressal (ILO 2025b). Demonstrates that emerging economies can legislate binding digital labour protections. Directly relevant to UNHCR operations in South Asia considering large numbers of gig workers in the region.

Considering the existing legislation, it is also important for UNHCR to take into account special vulnerabilities of refugees when developing own policy for work conditions of social enterprise programmes in data labelling, recommendation for which will be presented in the last part of this paper.

6. Policy recommendations

  1. Prioritize integrated pathways to sustainable livelihoods

To strengthen the long-term impact of digital livelihood programs, UNHCR should move beyond short-term output metrics and tie recommendations to longitudinal evidence that refugee participants progress toward stable, formal employment. Innovation grants can be impactful if directed toward programs that build genuinely transferable skills, such as advanced coding, ensuring that refugees, including those with higher education, are supported toward meaningful economic mobility instead of entry-level microwork.

  1. Adopt minimum labour standards via the Fairwork Framework

Current UN initiatives have made valuable progress on digital literacy and cyber risk awareness. To build on this foundation and ensure that digital livelihood programs deliver on their self-reliance promise, UNHCR should formally endorse the Fairwork Framework (Fairwork n.d.) as a baseline for recommendations to social enterprises across five dimensions:

  • Fair pay

UNHCR should work with social enterprises towards replacing piece-rate structures that produce poverty-level earnings with living wage thresholds adapted to host-country cost of living. Enterprises should be required to publish transparent, disaggregated income data as a condition of humanitarian endorsement, replacing the current practice of curated success stories with longitudinal evidence that the work actually generates economic self-reliance.

  • Fair conditions

Because employer-provided mental health support has been documented as often inadequate and even harmful for workers, UNHCR should mandate that trauma-informed mental health care for refugee data laborers be funded and managed entirely independently of employer control with particular attention to the double exposure risk for refugees labelling content from their own countries of origin.

  • Fair contracts

UNHCR is encouraged to work with social enterprises to review the use of NDAs in refugee data labelling contexts, exploring whether worker protections and client confidentiality can be balanced through alternative grievance mechanisms. Proactive disclosure of client identities and dataset purposes, where feasible, would help workers make informed decisions about the work they undertake.

  • Fair management

UNHCR should call on social enterprises to introduce meaningful human oversight of algorithmic performance systems, including the 90-97% accuracy thresholds enforced under time pressure, and to ensure that no worker faces income reduction or dismissal risk for raising concerns about task content. Task timelines should be set in consultation with workers, instead of dictated by client delivery schedules alone in order to improve both working conditions and output quality.

  • Fair representation

UNHCR should require social enterprises to build worker representation into their governance structures, viewing them as central voices with real influence over pricing negotiations, task standards and client selection. These should include, among others, regular anonymous worker surveys, introduction of Beneficiary Advisory boards which can receive concerns from workers, as well as allowing to form unions.

7. Literature list

  1. Al-Hammada, R. (2024). “If I Had Another Job, I Would Not Accept Data Annotation Tasks.”
  2. Altenried, M. (2024). Mobile workers, contingent labour: Migration, the gig economy and the multiplication of labour. Economy and Space.
  3. Bansla, V. (2025). How thousands of ‘overworked, underpaid’ humans train Google’s AI to seem smart. Internet source. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2025/sep/11/google-gemini-ai-training-humans
  4. Battisti, S. (2019). Digital Social Entrepreneurs as Bridges in Public-Private Partnerships. Journal of Social Entrepreneurship.
  5. Berhane Gebrekidan, F. (2024). Content moderation: The harrowing, traumatizing job that left many African data workers with mental health issues and drug dependency. Data Workers Inquiry.
  6. Clark, T. (2021). The Gig Is Up: An Analysis of the Gig-Economy and an Outdated Worker Classification System in Need of Reform, 19 Seattle J. Soc. Just.
  7. CWA Union. (2025). Ghost Workers in the AI Machine: U.S. Data Workers Speak Out About Big Tech’s Exploitation. Internet source. URL: https://cwa-union.org/ghost-workers-ai-machine#workers-value
  8. De Stefano, V. (2015). The Rise of the “Just-in-Time Workforce”: On-Demand Work, Crowdwork, and Labor Protection in the “Gig Economy”.
  9. De Stefano, V. (2016). The Rise of the “Just-in-Time Workforce”: On-Demand Work, Crowdwork, and Labor Protection in the “Gig Economy”. Comparative labor law.
  10. Department of Employment and Workplace Relations. (2024). Fair Work (Digital Labour Platform Deactivation Code) Instrument 2024.
  11. Easton-Calabria, E., & Hackl, A. (2023). Refugees in the digital economy: The future of work among the forcibly displaced. Journal of Humanitarian Affairs, 4(3).
  12. Equidem. (2025). Scroll. Click. Suffer. The Hidden Human Cost of Content Moderation and Data Labelling.
  13. EUR-LEX. (2024). Directive (EU) 2024/2831 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on improving working conditions in platform work.
  14. Fairwork. Principles. URL: https://fair.work/en/fw/principles/
  15. Hao, K., Hernandez, A. (2022). How the AI industry profits from catastrophe. Internet source. URL: https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/04/20/1050392/ai-industry-appen-scale-data-labels/
  16. Human Rights Watch. (2024). World report 2025. New York.
  17. Humans in the Loop. (2024). Impact Report 2023.
  18. Humans in the Loop. (2025). Impact Report 2024.
  19. ILO. (2024). Fair Work (Digital Labour Platform Deactivation Code) Instrument 2024 under the Fair Work Act. Internet source. URL: https://digitallabour.ilo.org/legislation/fair-work-digital-labour-platform-deactivation-code-instrument-2024-under-fair-work-act
  20. ILO. (2025a). Exploring the gig economy: Challenges and opportunities A self-guided resource.
  21. ILO. (2025b). The Bihar Platform Based Gig Workers (Registration, Safety and Welfare) Act, 2025. Internet source. URL: https://digitallabour.ilo.org/legislation/bihar-platform-based-gig-workers-registration-safety-and-welfare-act-2025.
  22. ILO. (2025c). Gig Workers Act 2025. Internet source. URL: https://digitallabour.ilo.org/legislation/gig-workers-act-2025
  23. ILO (2026). Convention concerning decent work in the platform economy. ILC.114/Convention No. 193. URL: https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/2026-06/ILC114-Instrument%20C.193-EN.pdf.
  24. ILO. Promotion, inclusion and protection of refugees and host communities in the digital and gig economy. Internet source. URL: https://www.ilo.org/projects-and-partnerships/projects/promotion-inclusion-and-protection-refugees-and-host-communities-digital.
  25. Jenkins, T. (2024). Garbage in Garbage out. Internet source. URL: https://www.applogicnetworks.com/blog/garbage-in-garbage-out
  26. Kaneti, M. (2025). Social Enterprise Solutions for Migrants, Microwork, and AI Ethics: The Case of HiTL. Human Service Organizations: Management, Leadership & Governance, 49(5), 609-627.
  27. Le Poidevin, O. (2026). Exclusive: Cash-strapped UN refugee agency to cut more jobs, even as crises mount. Internet source. URL: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/cash-strapped-un-refugee-agency-cut-more-jobs-even-crises-mount-2026-05-18/
  28. Malaysia Parliament. (2025). Rang Undang-undang Pekerja Gig 2025. D.R. 27/2025.
  29. Miceli, M. (2024). “I hope this isn’t for weapons.” How Syrian data workers train AI. Internet source. URL: https://untoldmag.org/i-hope-this-isnt-for-weapons-how-syrian-data-workers-train-ai/
  30. Microsoft. (2026). AI Diffusion Report. Global AI Adoption in 2025—A Widening Digital Divide.
  31. Portales, L. (2019). Basics, Characteristics, and Differences of Social Entrepreneurship.
  32. PRIO (2025). New data shows conflict at historic high as U.S. signals retreat from world stage. Internet source. URL: https://www.prio.org/news/3616
  33. PRS. (2025). The Bihar Platform Based Gig Workers (Registration, Safety and Welfare) Act. No 8.
  34. Sama. (2022). Environmental & Social Impact Report 2022.
  35. Subul. (2024). Annual Impact Report 2024.
  36. SuperAnnotate (2025). What is data labeling? The ultimate guide. Internet source. URL: https://www.superannotate.com/blog/guide-to-data-labelling
  37. Techfugees. From tech user to tech empowered (#Empowerment). Internet source. URL: https://www.notion.so/covidrefugees/2-From-tech-user-to-tech-empowered-Empowerment-11392e4039c8492d8cef375417c01166
  38. UNCTAD. (2025). 2025 Technology and Innovation report. Internet source. URL: https://unctad.org/publication/technology-and-innovation-report-2025
  39. UNHCR. (2005). Handbook for Self-Reliance. Geneva.
  40. UNHCR. (2023). Refugees’ Access to Jobs and Financial Services. Background Guide. Challenge Topic #3.
  41. UNHCR. Refugee Data Finder. Internet source. URL: http://unhcr.org/refugee-statistics.
  42. World Weather Attribution. (2025). Unequal evidence and impacts, limits to adaptation: Extreme weather in 2025. Internet source. URL: https://www.worldweatherattribution.org/unequal-evidence-and-impacts-limits-to-adaptation-extreme-weather-in-2025/

Endnotes

[i] The difference is mostly visible in these two websites of the same social enterprise: The NGO part: https://humansintheloop.org/impact/foundation/, the corporate part: https://humansintheloop.org/

[ii] See, for example, two entities of this social enterprise:  Na’amal. URL: https://naamal.org/, Na’amal Agency. URL: https://agency.naamal.org/.

[iii] See the website: HITL. URL: https://humansintheloop.org/.

[iv] Look, for instance at the following social enterprise sources: Techfugees. Inclusion. URL: https://techfugees.com/inclusion/,  Medium. Na’amal, DOT, and The Conrad N. Hilton Foundation Launch Follow-Up to Successful Digital Skills Programme in Ethiopia. Internet source. URL: https://na3amal.medium.com/naamal-dot-and-the-conrad-n-9c2268fd56b2

Arbitrary cognitive offloading to GenAI: Does the current policy landscape account for the right to quality education of children and youth in the European Union?

Abstract

General-purpose generative AI (GenAI) is increasingly used by young learners in the European Union, with 20% of individuals aged 15–29, approximately 15 million people, relying on it for educational tasks such as information retrieval, feedback, or full task delegation. While cognitive offloading is a natural part of human learning, GenAI’s ease of use risks disrupting efficient learning processes, potentially depriving children and youth of their right to quality education, including foundational skills like literacy, numeracy, and critical thinking.

This paper argues that the unmediated use of GenAI in educational settings undermines the right to quality education by interfering with cognitive development. It examines the role of cognitive load, metacognition, and cognitive offloading in learning, linking these concepts to GenAI’s potential to disrupt memory consolidation, problem-solving, and critical thinking. The analysis evaluates the current European policy landscape, focusing on the EU AI Act, OECD Digital Education Outlook 2026, and the European Parliament CULT Committee’s 2026 briefing to assess whether existing hard and soft policies address the cognitive risks of GenAI. While these policies recognize risks, they primarily target AI-enhanced educational technologies rather than general-purpose GenAI, leaving a regulatory gap.

The paper concludes that arbitrary cognitive offloading via GenAI jeopardizes the normative goals of quality education, as defined by frameworks like UNICEF’s and Bloom’s Revised Taxonomy. It calls for a revision of the EU’s normative approach to general-purpose GenAI, emphasizing the need to protect young learners’ right to cognitive development and autonomy.

1. Introduction

Generative AI (GenAI) is usually defined based on its ability to create (“generate”) new audiovisual and textual content, but it can also be defined by the fact that this ability enables it to serve a broad array of use cases. In other words, GenAI is also general-purpose AI. It is in this latter respect that young learners in the European Union use it. Indeed, they are its heaviest users. In 2025, 20% of them use it in the context of their education. This amounts to a total estimated number of approximately 15 million[1] people between 15 and 29 years that use GenAI to find information, seek feedback for their assignment, or delegate entire tasks.

Given its general-purpose nature, the sheer ease to delegate cognitive tasks has been shown to disrupt the efficiency of learning processes and therefore carries high risks for young people to de deprived of the quality education they are entitled to.  At the same time, offloading cognitive tasks is part of every human experience. A young learner usually is cognitively not yet in a position to learn how to solve a problem and to solve a problem in the same instance. Learning strategies provide means to reduce occurring cognitive load, and to foster an effective learning process. GenAI seems to interfere with the equation of keeping required cognitive effort to produce deep understanding.

In this paper, I am going to argue that GenAI in educational settings[2] deprives children and youth from their human right to quality education, specifically from their right to acquire basic formative skills, including literacy, numeracy and critical thinking. I am going to lay out this argument in three steps:

In the first part of this paper, the background section, I provide context about the human learning process, the influence of cognitive load, and subsequent strategies such as cognitive offloading and metacognition. I establish links to GenAI’s possible interference with learning and human cognitive development. Especially young learners who are building their cognitive architecture are susceptible to irreversible consequences. Such consequences include failed memory consolidation, cognitive atrophy, illiteracy, impaired problem solving, lack of critical thinking, and consequently loss of autonomy and human dignity. I connect these concerns to the human right to education, examining the meaning of quality education and its links to educational goals. In the middle part, I am using a case study to establish a comprehensive understanding of GenAI’s intricate impacts on cognitive and metacognitive dimensions of young learners.

In the third part, I analyse the current remedial standings of European hard and soft policies for cognitive impact dimensions of general-purpose AI. The EU AI Act being the baseline, the OECD Education Outlook 2026 report and the CULT Committee’s briefing 2026 are centre pieces of the analysis. These reports recognize the pressing dangers on cognitive development of GenAI in education and propose risk mitigations. Amending a hard regulatory element of a cognitive criterion in the EU AI Act is a deliberative proposal forward but designed with AI-enhanced education technologies in mind.

Finally, the paper takes the occasion to discuss GenAI’s normalisation and that the current understandings should lead to revise our normative approach to general-purpose AI.

2. Methodology

This paper originally set out to examine the cognitive influences to which young people are exposed through the use of GenAI during their formative years, and how the European policy landscape is currently addressing this. Following a literature review in February 2026, the initial finding was sobering: no significant policy instruments yet existed. However, when the two documents OECD Digital Education Outlook 2026 and CULT Committee Briefing were published in March 2026, it became necessary to revise both the initial research question and the methodology for addressing it.

Conceived as a policy analysis, this paper now examines whether GenAI influences the human learning process to such an extent that the right to a quality education is at risk, and how the latest policy measures address this issue to significantly reduce this risk.

To answer these questions, a qualitative approach was taken, overlaying existing scientific findings with internationally applicable law and political regulatory procedures. Sources were selected accordingly, including scientific studies, background papers, journalistic sources, and a statistical report.

  • Scientific studies: A total of 20 primary scientific studies were selected from the fields of cognitive psychology, cognitive science, computer science, educational science, and neuroscience. These were identified via keyword searches (e.g. cognitive offloading, cognitive overreliance, cognitive atrophy, extended mind, critical thinking, artificial intelligence and the education of children and young people) and through references within the background papers.
  • Foundational papers: Nine foundational documents on general-purpose AI and education in the European context (OECD, European Commission, European Parliament) were selected. These were identified via keyword searches (e.g. cognitive dimensions, AI harms, European policy, European Education). Two of these documents, namely the OECD Digital Education Outlook 2026 and the CULT Committee Briefing 2026, for in-depth policy analysis as they were the only ones addressing the issue at a pan-European level at that time.
  • Journalistic sources: These serve to enrich the paper qualitatively, but do not contribute to the onus of proof.
  • Statistical report: One selected document (“Young people in Europe: A statistical summary 2022”) provides descriptive evidence of stated user figures, but does not analyse the figures themselves.

Based on this data, a comprehensive picture of the state of scientific knowledge in this area can be formed, enabling valid conclusions to be drawn about the comprehensiveness of policy measures. However, the consequences and effects of the measures cannot be predicted based on the available data. This also means that the conclusions of this study are limited in terms of the possible positive and negative consequences of GenAI use on cognitive development. Consequently, any argument relying on this evidence base is euqally limited.

3. Background

This section of the paper introduces concepts and issues required for an analysis of the paper’s leading question on the impact of arbitrary cognitive offloading on the goals of education, and the influence of European policy: cognitive load theory, metacognitive laziness, the goals of education and EU education policy.

Cognitive Load Theory

Learning is a process involving information. When there is more information than the brain’s working memory can handle, or too little, the learning process is hindered.

Cognitive Load Theory is based on the assumption that the working memory has a very limited capacity, and that learning places a cognitive load on it. In contrast, the long-term memory has virtually unlimited capacity. Learning involves taking in information and processing it inside the working memory before subsequently storing it in the long-term memory. This storage, in turn, takes the form of schemata: complex knowledge structures containing multiple types of knowledge, e.g. declarative (knowing-that), or procedural (knowing-how) knowledge. It is important to emphasise that accumulating knowledge alone does not lead to expertise; instead, complex schemata differentiate experts from novice learners.

Managing cognitive load in the working memory influences the efficient construction of a person’s cognitive architecture. According to John Sweller, cognitive load originates from intrinsic, extraneous or germane sources. Intrinsic load arises from efforts to process the content of a task or the complexity of a problem, whereas extraneous load originates from the instructional design and accessibility of the task. Germane load contributes to schema construction, a highly desirable learning outcome. Thus learning conditions should reduce extraneous load, while intrinsic and germane load should be increased. This combination improves learners’ chances to build the foundations for deep learning and, consequently, deep understanding. For more information on this topic, see Sweller et al. (1998).

Metacognitive Laziness

Cognitive offloading is a strategy to regulate efforts of learning. Formally, it is defined as “the use of physical action to alter the information processing requirements of a task so as to reduce cognitive demand” (Risko & Gilbert, 2016, p. 676). Counting with one’s fingers, taking notes or navigating with a GPS, these are all forms of cognitive offloading.

The kind of load that is offloaded through these tasks depends on the intended learning goal: if someone is trying to get to a location in a city quickly perhaps due to an emergency, it would not be detrimental for them to use a GPS, but it would be detrimental for them if they were trying to learn the city’s geography to ease navigation later. In both situations, the intrinsic load (the factual information itself, e.g., the ways around the city) and germane load (the motivation and effort that are required, e.g., to build the schemata of the city) are offloaded. However, in the second scenario, the person would not want to offload these, because they are purposefully trying to build schemata in their long-term memory.

Given that the learning process is an essential part of the cognitive development of children and young people, the function of cognitive offloading should be to make learning objectives achievable, not to effectively do the objectives for them. Take for example using a calculator for arithmetic operation versus counting by hand. Children who use their hands show substantive cognitive resources and are more efficient in arithmetic calculations  (Thevenot et al., 2025). In fact, germane load has been shown to enhance the learning effect, for example determining which new information aligns with existing knowledge (Gerlich, 2025; Risko & Gilbert, 2016, p. 685).

Taking self-regulated learning decisions, such as deciding over single cognitive tasks to perform, or to offload, is a human intellectual capacity called metacognition. Metacognition is thinking about thinking, and supplies an additional form of thinking that supports the learning process. Essentially, the learner can realize what they do not know to perform a task. Through metacognition, thinking has the chance to become critical thinking, e.g. when continuing the search for more reliable sources of information, or adjusting ones strategies of fact-checking (Singh et al., 2025; Winne, 2021). The deliberative effort from metacognition and its attached decision-making creates an additional cognitive load, the metacognitive load. Take for example the act of evaluating the perceived difficulty of a task. Usually such evaluation consists of a multi-stage process where the individual assesses if they can retrieve the specific knowledge from their memory, how easy or hard this retrieval might be, or if the expected utility of, e.g., conducting a Google search right away, would be higher than actually engaging in a recalling from memory process. A metacognitive belief is formed that forms an argumentative ground for the learners final decision.

These metacognitive actions cause an additional cognitive load in the working memory of the learner. Challenges to sustained metacognitive engagement originate in self-perceived capability to solve a problem, low achievement motivation or complexity of a given task. Unlike offloading cognitive tasks for load reduction as discussed earlier, metacognition does not need offloading in that sense. Instead, the learner metacognitively disengages. This behaviour is called metacognitive laziness.

Pedagogical approaches propose metacognitive scaffolding techniques that enable learners to self-regulate and stay engaged with the task at hand. Scaffolding proposes to solve a task by means of distinct engagement phases: planning (“What is it that I must do? Have I done a task like that before? What can I solve independently? What can I not solve independently?), execution (How well do I understand the material? Can I use this source? Should I seek help for this part, and why?) and reflection (Have I managed to solve the task to my satisfaction? What have I learnt about my approach of such a task? What does that mean for next time?). This approach funnels information in a way that they turn into germane load. In that case, what could have been an extraneous load, is transformed into a learning plan, or tasks that are broken down into subtasks and evolve in difficulty.

By the same token, freeing up mental resources from low-cognitive involvement tasks, e.g. grammar checking, can facilitate critical thinking which is considered an activity of high-cognitive involvement. Again, depending on the goal of the learning task, these activities oscillate between different types of cognitive load.

The Goals of Education

Education is a fundamental human right. Article 26(2) of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) sets forth that “Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace” (United Nations, 1948).

In this sense, education is not the direct realisation of human dignity, but a necessary consequence arising from the exercise of the right to education. Therefore it stands to reason that access to any form of education alone is not sufficient to achieve this level of impact; quality standards must also be met. To get to the bottom of the question of whether arbitrary cognitive offloading undermines the impact of education, the first step is to examine whether international quality criteria are in place and examine whether the of GenAI violates these criteria.

The minimum criteria of quality in education aren’t prescribed in an international treaty and therefore, quality education cannot benefit from an international standard that nations can be held accountable for[3].
A paper authored by UNICEF (2000) characterizes quality education through the dimensions of

  1. safe and inclusive schooling facilities, well-managed classrooms
  2. participants and their mental health
  3. child-centred teaching processes and assessment 
  4. curricula and content that enables the acquisition of basic skills (literacy, numeracy, and skills for life)
  5. outcomes that encompass knowledge, skills and attitudes, and are linked to national goals for education and positive participation in society.

Under point 4., the paper states that learning should be student-centred[4] and tailored to individual learning differences, and that “in general, curricula should emphasize deep rather than broad coverage of important areas of knowledge, authentic and contextualized problems of study, and problem-solving that stresses skills development as well as knowledge acquisition”. Here, it is also emphasized that content cannot be separated from the process, that is, how children learn to read is a product of what they are reading, and respectively, the literacy they develop. Numeracy being taught in an integrated manner provides foundations to develop logical reasoning and advanced interpretative communication skills. Both literacy, and numeracy, so goes the paper, form foundations to acquire life skills that include topics such as health, hygiene, etiquette, vocational skills. Thus, at the heart of defining the meaning of quality education lies a mediation of life skills imparting from content and process in equal terms. The process should rely on student-centred methods, and practices to elevate skills to competence. 

UNICEF’s definition builds on Robert Marzano’s New Taxonomy. It draws a distinct line between lower-order versus higher-order thinking skills, and the learner’s active engagement in deciding how to transform information (Marzano & Kendall, 2007, pp. 17–19). This one, in return, builds on Bloom’s Revised Taxonomy. The latter provides a framework that has largely informed our understanding of the role of schools, universities and further education institutions prior to UNICEF’s definition project. It assigns a cognitive, procedural and a declarative knowledge dimension to the intrinsic goal of education. Within the boundaries of this framework, education mediates capacities that require the interplay of knowledge acquisition, its immanent updating, and cognitive processes. Therefore, with an increase in complexity, school curricula should entertain ways to foster essential human skills and traits:

  1. memory consolidation and remembering
  2. understanding concepts
  3. applying judgement
  4. analysing
  5. evaluating
  6. creating

On the bottom level of complexity, lower-order thinking skills include storing and remembering facts, as well as understanding concepts. Higher-order thinking skills comprise the analysis, evaluation and application of complex judgement. Critical thinking, problem solving and decision making are compounds of these skills. The process that bears these compounds requires executive functioning[5] and metacognition. UNICEF makes mention of the thinking about thinking-activity in its definition of quality education under student-centredness. In other words, quality in education should account for mediating metacognitive skills because of its impact on forming cognitive abilities.

However, The metacognitive dimension of learning can be an inconsistently explicit aspect of the lived learning process in schools. Young children in early education years configure their workload by strategies such as counting with their fingers. Progressing towards more complex educational goals, older children begin to coordinate their cognitive skills with the task they have been given and develop an understanding about effective learning strategies. The development of these learning strategies can be actively construed, or accidentally, not knowingly, assimilated.

More traditional teacher-centred approaches to education assume a unidirectional transfer of knowledge from the teacher to the student, whereas constructivist approaches emphasise the active involvement of the student. At the heart of constructivism lies the idea that learner’s prior knowledge influences how and what of the new information is assessed and stored. Therefore, learners actively shape their personal learning process through monitoring and planning activities and consequently alter their individual epistemic journey. More importantly, constructivism values the learning process as a source for knowledge in and of itself. This is what Willingham referred to when he wrote that thought processes are intertwined with what is being thought about. According to him, it is impossible to engage in critical thinking when one has nothing to think critically about, e.g. a learner can only think critically about something based on their existing prior knowledge (2019).

In contrast, more traditional approaches operationalise the teacher’s cognitive skill and knowledge as the teaching transaction and assume that critical thinking can be facilitated by what is transmitted from the teacher to the learner. This pedagogical approach bears higher chances to encroach higher-order thinking skills, than a constructivist approach does. This insight matters for the critical assessment of the impacts of GenAI in the classroom.

EU Education Policy

What does current EU policy say about the intersection of AI and policy? To answer this question, we will use the EU AI Act as the baseline, as well as the OECD Education Outlook 2026 report and the CULT Committee’s 2026 briefing. In brief, the EU AI Act introduces a a trade-off between the acquisition of digital skills versus the acquisition of basic learning skills. The OECD report recommends a more effective use-approach to GenAI and thus contains no notable references to regulating cognitive influences. In contrast, the CULT Briefing considers amending the AI Act to include an assessment of precisely this cognitive impact. However, regulatory recommendations seem to be have been designed to address AI-enhanced learning technologies, and not GenAI. Therefore, further analysis is provided to propose additional mitigation strategies.

The EU AI Act

Recital 56, the EU AI act explicitly states that the deployment of AI systems is a realisation to the right for high-quality education, naming the acquisition of digital skills and competences, including critical thinking skills.

It reads “The deployment of AI systems in education is important to promote high-quality digital education and training and to allow all learners and teachers to acquire and share the necessary digital skills and competences, including media literacy, and critical thinking, to take an active part in the economy, society, and in democratic processes. (…)”.

At the same time, it classifies the same AI systems as high-risk in cases where they assess, monitor or evaluate individuals, and consequently the trajectory of their lives. This reasoning displays a profound gap regarding the perils of GenAI in the classroom – and outside of it. Fundamentally, the right to quality education encompasses the right to form digital literacy and critical thinking skills. In the case of GenAI, this seems deeply conflictual. The general-purpose nature of GenAI provokes arbitrary cognitive offloading when metacognitive capacities are not or only little developed and can imply cognitive risks for millions of young people. In other words, teaching digital skills using GenAI entails the risk of undermining other fundamental learning processes and skills. Given the concept of quality education as outlined here, it is reasonable to conclude that the consequences of such an undermining would cause greater harm than the teaching of digital skills could justify. The scientific groundwork for this hypothesis is presented in the case study of section 4.

This lays the ground for a suspicion that the EU AI Act’s specification to account for the right to quality education disables itself. Given the current evidence regarding GenAI in the classroom, it appears contradictory to ensure that digital skills are taught (e.g. prompting, understanding capabilities of an LLM) while also guaranteeing the development of higher-order thinking skills (e.g. discerning truth from falsehood, drawing conclusions from prior analysis). This contradiction is evident in the fact that GenAI allows for arbitrary cognitive offloading, resulting in children and young people receiving a lower standard of education than they would otherwise. Consequently, children and young people are unable to enjoy their full right to education.

The following parts provide an analysis of recent educational policy publication as well as a case study of a learner’s behavior when solving a learning task involving GenAI. The case study shall provide context for the analysis at stake: does European education policy recognize and address the cognitive dimensions of GenAI and their problematic impact on children and youth as beneficiaries of the right to education?

OECD Digital Education Outlook 2026

The OECD Digital Education Outlook 2026 (2026) has been chosen for review inside this project for two reasons. First, in 2023 the OECD published a background paper with the title “Generative AI in the classroom: From hype to reality?” which provided first insights of major issues with GenAI in classrooms (2023). The paper’s tone reflected on potentials for more dynamic classrooms and individualized learning. Second, it is authored by a long-standing international organisation, combining the represention of economic interests with a transnational analytical rigour. Findings and recommendations of OECD reports are of non-binding nature, collecting scientific evidence for informed public and political discussion.

The analysis focuses on the categories of learners, teachers and educational institutions[6] and sets out recommendations for all these target groups aimed at using GenAI to improve learning, teaching and institutional management. The report is framed around outcomes these groups create, are responsible for or are involved with.

The rise in content generated by GenAI constantly challenges the limits of our knowledge in everyday life. Misinformation and deception pose a challenge to society as a whole, the scale of which is already socially and politically evident, for example through media attacks on democratic systems or infringements of personal rights. Right at the outset, the report emphasises that the utility of higher-order thinking skills,  namely critical thinking, problem-solving and decision-making, as well as metacognitive abilities, will increase.

The report collected statistics from OECD member states to draw a more precise picture on age groups and level of education where GenAI is used and for which purposes. Globally, teenagers (age 12-17) make for the group among all age groups with highest usage, e.g. 90% of Estonian school students report making use of GenAI, followed by higher education students, e.g. 85% of French students reported having used a GenAI tool in 2025 at least once, where numbers were up to 94% for German students, with 65% of them reporting to use it daily or weekly. Looking at the most popular uses of GenAI within these groups, the report refers to a study conducted in seven European Countries by Vodafone Stiftung (Stiftung Vodafone, 2025):

Type of cognitive engagementType of learning taskSelf-reported use in %
Low-cognitive involvement tasking[7]finding information56
receiving explanatory support for terms and concepts45
High-cognitive involvement tasking[8]using complete solutions to given tasks    31
Meta-cognitive taskingmake use of interactive content to guide learning experience29
structuring and planning a personalised learning path20

The report indicates significant variances between countries which may be due to national differences in access, proliferation, dissemination, and cultural perception of GenAI tools, but differences in research methodology and assessment criteria might explain them equally well. Therefore, interpreting these numbers should be approached with caution.

CULT Briefing “Artificial Intelligence in the Classroom”

In early 2026, the Committee on Culture and Education (CULT) of the European Parliament (EP) received the briefing “Artificial Intelligence in the Classroom”, the first one centered around this question. Committees of the EP examine proposals prior to bringing them before the whole assembly. The CULT Committee works on european educational policy that promotes engaged and resilient European citizens through programs such as Erasmus+. Given that education is a matter of national sovereignty, CULT’s responsibility consists of vision building, convening, and deliberating educational opportunities, risks and challenges in the European Union. Findings and recommendations of CULT briefings are of non-binding nature that collect scientific evidence for deliberation. Inspite of their soft policy nature, it is said that these committee briefings project a baseline understanding of contemporary issues among stakeholders of European policy making. This marks the reasoning why this briefing has been chosen for review inside this project.

The report differentiates between GenAI and AI-enhanced educational technologies, and clarifies that most of the reported risks are associated with GenAI in an unmediated education context. In comparison, AI-enhanced educational technologies are product optimised for learning purposes. Therefore, there needs to be a bifurcated approach for governance and responsible use.

The CULT Briefing refers to identical usage figures already introduced in the OECD report discussed above. It adds that two thirds (63.8%) of young people aged 16–24 in the EU used GenAI in 2025 which makes for almost twice of the adult population (32.7%). Among this age group, 39.3% stated they were likely to use AI tools for formal education (Chounta, 2026, p. 2).

That means that around 20%[9] of young people in the EU use AI tools for formal education. Despite grounding its argumentation in the distinction between the substantive risks imposed by GenAI versus AI-enhanced educational technologies, the report does not issue usage numbers of the latter.

4. Case Study

To illustrate the challenges brought on by GenAI’s introduction into education, let us suppose a learner named “D” in early high school is given the task to compare two historical texts A and B from two authors about the same event and articulate the authors’ divergent viewpoints of the event. For example, do the authors reference different facts, what are their general tones, do they provide valid reasoning for their differing viewpoints, do they employ manipulation strategies and if so, what might be their motivations in doing so?

Learners are free to decide how they approach the task, e.g. reading text A first and taking notes, then text B and taking notes, or skimming both and underlining similarities and differences afterwards, or not making any marks at all. The aim of the task is not to resolve which of the authors is “right”, but to train the learner in at least four cognitive skills: working memory (keeping one text in mind while reading a second one), reading comprehension (decoding text, extracting meaning, constructing a representation of the text), sustained attention (identifying different or identical facts, deviations in wording), and critical thinking (analysing line of reasoning and manipulation strategies).

D trains their metacognitive skills when they decide which approach is more promising for them to achieve the task, when they monitor how well they have understood the text, if they need a second pass, and if they have sufficiently engaged with the critical questions. Last, the task imparts knowledge-that (declarative) of the event, and knowledge-how-to (procedural) about the approach of such a task. The latter fosters the development of mental schema, and repeating similar tasks will reinforce their availability, and differentiates unexperienced learners from experts.

Cognitive processes

Since there is evidence of positive learning impacts from usage modes where a chatbot takes on the role of a deliberative interlocuteur, a replication of the Socratic Method[10], it is possible to argue in favour of D making use of a modified GenAI (Monzon & Hays, 2025; Singh et al., 2025; Xu et al., 2025). However, the initial reading (reading comprehension skill) and note-taking (sustained attention) should not be skipped by D: The problematic use case we are concerned with here is if D uses GenAI to complete the entire task, e.g., prompting it to ingest and compare the two texts, their tone, the presence of manipulative tactics, and so on. In which case D neither works on the information contained in the task, nor gains the skills required to complete it.

Over-reliance

This skipping-through-the-learning-process qua the aid of GenAI has been shown to bring about a few direct and indirect consequences for the learner. For example, studies by Gerlich (2025), Kosmyna et al. (2025) and Zhai (2024) have shown that students who arbitrarily offload whole tasks to GenAI, such as D does, indeed hamper their cognitive development: They eperience distorted memory consolidation, aren’t able to speak about the topic later on, or cannot make cross connections to other learning contents. Overreliance captures the process of handing more tasks over to AI than the learner should have handed over according Cognitive Load theory. For example, D could ask for background information to the two texts D should compare, why they are meaningful, or what their public perception might me. In this case, D would involve GenAI for a lower-engagament portion of the task, and keep the rest of it for himself to process, thus he would rely on GenAI, but not overrely.

The suggestion that offloading low-cognitive-involvement-tasks facilitates critical thinking provides an important provocation for the critical assessment of GenAI in an educative setting: can we save critical thinking by enumerating the low-cognitive involvement tasks that children and youth can offload, and the critical thinking (along with other high-cognitive-involvement-tasks such as problem-solving and decision-making) will build and develop naturally?

Several clues should lead to the safe assumption that this is not the case:

In the case of D, the initial reading and taking notes, is typically the low-engagement portion of the task they should not offload if their learning goal is to improve critical thinking abilities through the appropriation of text. Through the act of reading, D’s metacognitive capabilities will do their part to assess how well they understand the text, if they possess information about such the problem of comparing two texts and how to solve them, and if they want to seek help.

By retrieving and deciding about the information to retrieve, D is already with the problem in a critical way (Willingham, 2019). What is more, the metacognitive decision process that underpins the analytical process just described would be massively hampered, or disrupted, if there was a generic answer to the offloading question. Hence, offloading a cognitive task for reasons of ascribed cognitive engagement status does not solve the problem of cognitive development, even if it does solve the problem of arbitrary offloading. This is an important insight to come back to when evaluating possible solutions to the problem.

Atrophy

Cognitive atrophy is a consequence of cognitive offloading of single tasks, and to overreliance, particularly when heavily repeated. A well known example of cognitive atrophy is a form of functional illiteracy: the degration of once acquired reading and writing skills. It occurs when these skills are not regularly used, for example when D consistently watches images or videos instead of reading texts, or prefers digital text-to-speech applications over D’s own writing, or simply lets GenAI do the reading. When the cognitive pathways that are involved in reading and writing process are not demanded, they atrophy. In fact, the last OECD’s Survey of Adult Skills (2024) revealed that adult functional illiteracy is rising globally while it had been steadily reduced in the past century[11].

Metacognitive processes

Still in the young internet days, Nicholas Carr described how using intellectual technology, whereby referring to the internet, had changed his ability to absorb a long read, and to memorize what he had read. He asked if losing the ability for deep reading eroded the ability for deep thinking (Carr, 2008). This question kicked of a series of Google Effect-studies that primarily focused on individual memory allocation in tension with an externalised memory (the internet), and others provided the first links between offloading strategies best described as metacognitive laziness and illusions of competence, also called false mastery. For example, one study showed the augmentation of people’s self-esteem, and overrated feeling of having-knowledge-in-their-head when they had completed a quiz successfully with Google’s help. They would also overestimate how well they would perform in the next test of that kind without an external aid (Fisher et al., 2015). In a similar setting, people should solve a quiz and were divided in two groups that either was allowed to use, or not to use google. Before answering the quiz, they were asked whether they would know the answer. Interestingly, the group that was allowed to google the answer made significantly less effort in thinking about whether they would know (retrieve) the answer by themselves (A. F. Ward, 2013; D. M. W. Ward Adrian F., 2013).

Laziness and the illusion of competence

One of the many outcomes teachers have observed, and research evidence confirms, concerns the dissociation between improved performance on assigned tasks and longterm skill or knowledge acquisition: these studies show that writing an essay with GenAI improves essay scores (the outcome) but does not increase knowledge gains. Furthermore, in another study, students were asked to assess their own pen and paper writing for improvement: the setting allowed one student group to seek help from human tutors, and another one from of GenAI. The results indicate that the GenAI-group would skip a pre-assessment all together, and ask GenAI directly for improvement suggestions, whereas the human tutor group followed the model of the “help seeking” theory (Chen et al., 2025; Fan et al., 2025).

The latest studies examining the impact of GenAI on metacognition confirm correlations between metacognitive laziness and illusions of competence. The randomized study by Fan et al. (2025) found that the convenience of AI can undermine learners’ engagement in the learning processes (planning, monitoring, and revision). The learner hands over their metacognition to the tool.

Another study confirm that students may solve more tasks in less time when they ask for the solution but show lack of genuine understanding. What is more, learners’  self-reported confidence of learning gains is systematically overrated (Singh et al., 2025, p. 2). For novice learners who are still building schema and have less knowledge about what they do not know, this often invokes the Dunning-Kruger effect, where people tend to vastly overestimate their level of knowledge, particularly in new, unfamiliar domains (Kruger & Dunning 1999).

Overerstimations of gained competence are not exclusive to GenAI but span across digital learning where ease of use is confused with depth of learning. GenAI’s design, its availability and accessibility, or its generalness, suggest an ease of use for any given task and provides ground for metacognitive laziness through which arbitrary offloading is catalyzed. The category mistake of users to confuse ease of use with cognitive involvement impacts the development or training of critical thinking abilities, and is, consequentially, detrimental for developing expertise (Lodge & Loble, 2026, p. 23). These findings are evidence for GenAI promoting metacognitive laziness.

How do these findings translate to D’s behavior? During the initial reading, D feels a certain cognitive and metacognitive burden synthesizing in their head, e.g. the difficulty of the vocabulary, the length of the text, grasping the overall tone and meaning of the text. Overwhelmed, D decides to prompt GenAI to generate the required output. D sees the output, looks at it briefly with satisfaction, thinking: “That does not look so difficult, looks like I could do that myself”, and pastes it into D’s homework document. D having formed a belief about a newly gained competence in solving such a task, 2 weeks later, a class exam contains a similar assignment. D reads the instructions, and then both texts. Soon, D metacognitively reflects that the task appears to be at least as difficult as it did two weeks ago, and that D beliefs not being up to the task. Nervous and cognitively overwhelmed, D takes notes while struggling to remember the first text during the lecture of the second. D then then turns to the main part of the task to analyze divergent viewpoints (e.g. by presented facts, general tone etc.). D tries to recall the ouptut the GenAI had produced to guide the process but fails to do so. Even more nervous, D undertakes the analysis nonetheless in an ad-hoc, unsystematic fashion.
If the condition was not the exam setting, but comparable situation from the initial confrontation with such a task, it is legitimate to assume that D would once more rely on GenAI and arbitrarily offload D’s cognitive involvement to solve this task, and the vicious cycle between over-reliance, illusion of competence and metacognitive laziness would continue.

Metacognitive laziness and social costs, transaction costs

Learning strategies often involve seeking help when facing challenges. In that case, the learner metacognitively assesses if they involve teachers, peers or GenAI to solve their learning tasks. Studies show that seeking help from GenAI alters the help-seeking process. Students would seek help earlier in their process from GenAI than they would from a human, and skip to evaluate the generated answer they received. The study reasons this finding with the involved costs of help-seeking:  if the perceived knowledge-gain is lower than the cost of the social interaction with the teacher, e.g. because of possible reputation loss, then they either avoid seeking help, or involve GenAI instead. This finding confirms the risk for metacognitive laziness in front of GenAI, and it social costs precisely to inhibit this laziness (Chen et al., 2025).

Another study could show that students who ask for explanations, instead of solutions, increase their understanding of the topic, but not the volume of solved tasks. The same study reveals that simply disabling the copy and paste function invokes higher transaction costs, and prevents a decrease in required learning efforts (Lehmann & Cornelius, 2025, p. 24).

Reviewed studies confirm deep disturbances with learning efforts that shape the development of cognitive abilities and skills of novice learners like children and youth. The cognitive consequences include long-term memorization issues, and distorted schema building. Compound higher-order thinking skills depend on the quality of metacognitive strategies, that is, they either do not form or atrophy when effort is replaced by laziness. There is a critical subsequent dynamic at play that brings about overconfident learners who overestimate their acquired skills while they miss opportunities to develop long-term expertise. To summarize, associated risks of GenAI for learning purposes could outweigh its anticipated benefits (Yan et al., 2024).

Other issues

The impacts of arbitrary (meta-)cognitive offloading span from failing to store and recall information in the long-term memory, making it difficult for learners to refer and discuss what they thought they had learned, to cognitive atrophy and metacognitive laziness, which imply the loss of literacy, numeracy, critical thinking, and adaptive problem solving. Beyond these effects, they distort judgements of the self as a knower, the trustworthiness of the source, and the epistemic value of the learning process. In the grand scheme of education, numerous consequences for young people, and society at large, arise.

Among many, the impact on already weakened democratic decision-making will increase. If young people cannot rely on learnt schema for critical thinking, their ability to discern truth from deception will cause even greater luring into epistemic bubbles, and a loss of common social concerns related to work, environment, health (Rose, 2026).

Furthermore, If learners use GenAI to request the entire result of what would have only been the last stage of the learning process they would have gone through, what does that mean for the value of the process of education, a process that forms a human from a very young age to young adulthood? Does that mean that only the final result matters, the grade, the credential? While workplaces are becoming more and more enshrined with GenAI, for many it seems like schools are the only places where humans can still cultivate thinking. If they are deprived of the right to earn the fruits of the laborious process of education, how can they become the autonomous, self-reliant person entitled to dignity qua their status of being a human (Pollmann, 2026; Rose, 2026)?

By the same token, what does that mean for the value of a genuine human creation, e.g. a piece of writing, versus one that has been entirely simulated to be such? With the ever more sophisticated GenAI models, detecting human-made versus GenAI-made content is more and more difficult discern, and raises the same pressing questions surrounding the status of truth, and human dignity.

5. Potential Remedies

This section surveys some of the potential remedies to the problems discussed above.

OECD Recommendations

One key finding the report highlights is a study showing student’s inclination to increase the use of GenAI with an augmented workload, for any given task. Concurrently, higher usage was correlated with procrastination, self-reported memory loss, and finally overall academic performance. Worth mentioning here is that an arbitrary delegation of cognitive work to GenAI increases student’s propensity for naïve overreliance on these systems. As a result, students struggle to assess trustworthiness and quality of GenAI’s outputs, and submit to this discrepancy, leading to lost opportunities to develop critical thinking, or related skills (Abbas et al., 2024; Zhai et al., 2024). After reviewing 106 experimental studies on human-AI collaboration, a meta-analysis found that task performance was worst in the collaborative setting compared to AI or a human solving a task independently (Vaccaro et al., 2024). This is yet another confirmation towards overreliance and the illusion of cognitive mastery. These findings demonstrate GenAI’s negative potential on cognitive development.

The OECD report proposes that learners and teachers adopt an effective-use approach to GenAI. Recommendations for effective uses list behavioral and procedural interventions for learners and teachers to prevent large scale negative impacts on societies and economies, such as an increase in illiteracy. While these recommendations align with latest scientific findings, it remains questionable if they provide actionable measures for students and teachers. In the face of it, learning to learn with GenAI sounds like a reasonable recommendation. However, which of these findings provides us with evidence to infer meanings about effective uses of GenAI for all learners at all stages? What constitutes use cases that respect the learner’s right to quality education in a way that encompasses GenAI without compromising on all indicated dimensions? In addition, the effective use-recommendation raises concerns regarding the student-centredness: if school curricula shall be designed to adopt to student needs, it seems contradictory to require the learner to adapt to how the tool functions. Shouldn’t rather the tool be designed in a way that adapts to the learner by default? Here, the CULT Briefing’s recommendations offer a range of approaches to adequately address the complexity and impact of socio-technical systems within education.

However, the OECD’s recommendations shift the conversation from a frame of positive potential by GenAI on to a frame of adaptation of learning to GenAI. By outlining these findings, the report challenges the idea of GenAI’s positive potential to promote high-quality education and underscores the need for purpuseful adaptation in the classroom but does not provide solid grounds for continued delivery of quality education.

CULT Recommendations

Unlike the OECD report, which puts its entire remedy belief into effective use pedagogies, the CULT Briefings’ suggestions cover a mix of pedagogical interventions, new regulatory framing, and cognitive impact assessment.

Pedagogical interventions

The educational interventions incorporate the ‘effective use’ recommendations from the 2026 OECD report[12] which are intended to create the conditions necessary to promote “cognitively safe and productive use of AI” in schools. Interestingly, the term ‘cognitively safe’ appears here without being further explained, and interestingly the OECD report makes no use of this term at all. [13].

Firstly, the efficient use of AI systems is reiterated in the CULT Briefing as a pedagogy-first recommendation, in line with the evidence-based proposal of the OECD report. AI systems should only be used if they serve clearly defined learning objectives, and not be “deployed as a general-purpose convenience”(Chounta, 2026, p. 6). Secondly, this is followed by the recommendation to use AI systems that are specifically designed for teaching purposes; therefore, general-purpose AI should not be used at all. Thirdly, metacognitive scaffolding (planning, reflection and evaluation) and a mastery orientation (augmenting knowledge through exploration, questioning and connection) are preferred approaches to effective use in all cases (Xu et al., 2025). However, the third point in particular raises the question of whether this refers to general-purpose AI or an AI system designed specifically for education. Fourthly, age and the associated learning objectives must be taken into account: “The cognitive and developmental differences between a seven-year-old and a sixteen-year-old demand genuinely differentiated governance frameworks, not a single age-neutral approach”. (Chounta, 2026, p. 7)

Regulatory frame

Legally binding frameworks such as the General Data Protection Regulation and the Council of Europe Framework Convention on AI and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law do not address the risks as they are set in the CULT briefing. The EU AI Act (Annex III) on the other hand classifies applications as high-risk which decide over individuals’ learning trajectories through conformity assessments, admissions, evaluation and student progress monitoring, in short the trajectory of someone’s biography (European Data Protection Supervisor, 2025). The CULT briefing suggests the revision of some areas that create ambiguity, e.g. the report asks if adaptive learning systems and intelligent tutoring systems (which generate personalised learning pathways and may implicitly steer students’ learning process) would constitute high-risk systems, given that they influence learning trajectories (Chounta, 2026, p. 7).

The report critically remarks, that “none of the existing regulatory instruments requires the systematic assessment of AI systems for their cognitive impact on child users before deployment in school settings. An AI system that increases short-term task performance while undermining long-term skill development would, under current frameworks, likely pass regulatory review” (Chounta, 2026, p. 8).

Consequently, the report conceptualizes a new cognitive outcome criterion for AI systems before their deployment in school settings. This represents a novelty in the European AI-related jurisdiction.

The briefing suggest the following measures for AI Systems:

  • mandating a cognitive impact assessment as an education-specific layer, within or alongside  the fundamental rights impact assessment (FRIA) of AI Act (Article 27) for high-risk AI systems, to be conducted before any AI system is deployed in compulsory school settings; it could require the assessment of cognitive load, metacognitive development, the learner’s developmental stage, and equity impact.
  • establishing minimum evidence standards for pedagogical efficacy claims as a condition for  AI systems used in education, e.g. providers must provide evidence for their claims, and standardisation labels could lever a signal to deploying institutions.
  • introducing a mandatory pedagogical evaluation (including cognitive dimensions of  learning) for AI systems acquired by public educational institutions before procurement as a condition of award, analogous to accessibility requirements embedded in public procurement for digital tools.

Cognitive Impact Assessment

The briefings’s analysis of the impacts of GenAI on the cognitive dimensions of education, elaborates on the consequences for cognitive development, including fundamental and  metacogntive skills, as well as autonomy, over-reliance and dependency. Thus, it elaborates on all aspects of the human right to quality in education, including “curricula and content that enables the acquisition of basic skills (literacy, numeracy, and skills for life)”.

Criticisms of the OECD Recommendations have raised concerns about scenarios in which learners’ rights to a quality education are violated when young students are required to learn how to learn with GenAI.Here is where the CULT Briefing emphasizes the importance to favor AI-enhanced learning technologies that are adapted to student’s needs over GenAI that cannot meet this need because of its general-purpose nature.

Interestingly, the report identifies the use of AI systems tailored to the learning context as the most important educational measure. It then recommends, in line with the OECD’s recommendations, that procedural and self-learning measures, such as adapting learning content to focus on learning how to learn, be given greater emphasis in the curriculum. Ultimately, however, neither this recommendation nor the one to use AI systems in an age-appropriate manner offers any new insight or a convincing solution to the problem of cognitive development in the face of GenAI.

The introduction of a new regulatory layer for cognitive impact assessment in the EU AI Act for high-risk applications is a novel regulatory approach that merits further consideration. The suggested remedies acknowledge the far-reaching consequences for young citizens when both binding and non-binding measures are distributed among several pedagogical stakeholders, caretakers as well as EdTech and GenAI manufacturers. While it is essential to incorporate an assessment of cognitive impacts in educational context in the AI Act, the suggested regulations should, in principle, be straightforward for AI-enhanced learning technology to comply with: these tools are already designed for educational purposes and built in an education-specific way. It will therefore be feasible for most providers to comply with the suggested standards and for deployers to perform the assessment.

Unexpectedly, however, there is no bifurcated approach to regulating GenAI versus AI-enhanced learning technologies. The briefing does not propose any formal or binding remedies to protect the right to a quality education despite GenAI. Instead, it creates the impression that the suggested amendments have been designed through the prism of AI tools already adapted to educational purposes in mind. For example, ‘establishing minimum evidence standards for pedagogical efficacy claims as a condition for AI systems used in education’ can only apply to producers who advertise their products as being designed for educational use.

Since both educational and regulatory interventions focus more on AI-enhanced  learning technologies than on GenAI, the question arises as to whether the measures that have been ‘left out’ suggest that GenAI is too general to be equipped with such guardrails?

This leads to the conclusion that the suggested mitigations do not suffice to protect children’s right to quality in education and that the problem of quality education in light of GenAI persits. The infringement has been partially addressed by the CULT Committee’s interventions.

6. Conclusion

Arbitrary cognitive offloading is detrimental to the human learning process, as much as a surplus of cognitive load is. An efficient learning process favors a balance between beneficial intrinsic and germane load, after the detrimental extrinsic load have been reduced. In the face of a learning problem to be solved, the beneficial load can be composed of low- and high-cognitive engagegement tasks, just as when D reads two literary texts with sustained attention, memorizes the content and then analyses and applies judgement. Beneficial load facilitates learning, and is highly dependent on the goal of the given learning task. When learners prompt GenAI to solve whole tasks for them, they offload cognition in an arbitrary manner. In that case, cognitive overreliance on GenAI reduces or even erases the possibility for a beneficial load, and the hampered learning process results in distorted memory consolidation, difficulties in retrieving facts, refering to and speaking about the supposedly learnt content, not even to speak of crossreferencing it. In the long term, cognitive development is impacted and basic cognitive skills might not form.

Learning is an active process in which learners learn how learning works, and that it is beneficial to offload irrelevant information to the external environment. However, the ease of use of GenAI can lead learners to reduce their metacognitive involvement. Metacognition constitutes a highly dynamic process that provides the learner with insight about their own thinking. Commonly described as thinking about thinking, it constitutes a part of cognitive load itself, and that often causes students to bypass this activity. Metacognitive laziness manifests in this bypassing and results in behaviors such as leaving generated output unverified, illusion of competence, limited capacities to develop expertise, and ultimately crippled critical thinking skills.

Against this backdrop, studies by Fan et al. (2025), Singh (2025) and Xu (2025) recommend that learning curricula should focus on teaching metacognitive skills. This would better equip learners to use GenAI efficiently in their learning process. For example, GenAI could be used to provide explanations rather than complete solutions, or suggest learning strategies and guide learners step by step through the learning process. These studies have shown that this approach improves learners’ critical thinking skills, deepens their understanding, and enhances their ability to learn independently.

The right to quality in education enshrines foundational learning objectives. Although the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) does not provide specific guidance on this matter, a UNICEF report from 2000 offers concrete normative guidance. Accordingly, quality in education is characterised by a focus on the learner and their mental health, an appropriate learning process and a curriculum that covers basic literacy, numeracy and life skills. The outcomes of quality in education contribute significantly to learners’ socialisation by shaping the development of knowledge, skills, and values. A closer examination of these qualitative learning objectives reveals their reference to Bloom’s revised taxonomy. Consequently, the normative understanding of the goals of quality education is underpinned by low- and high-order thinking skills, metacognition, and executive function. Preserving and promoting the process of achieving these goals is fundamental to the right to a good education, bridging the gap from cognitive development to human autonomy and dignity.

Recital 56 of the EU AI Act explicitly states that deploying AI systems is an expression of the right to a high-quality education, including digital and critical thinking skills. The OECD’s Digital Education Outlook report and the CULT Briefing largely concur in their analyses of the impact of GenAI on cognitive overreliance and metacognitive laziness. This is why the non-regulatory measures largely coincide and draw on similar evidence-based references. Recommendations include teaching metacognitive learning strategies, using GenAI for metacognitive scaffolding and taking a more differentiated approach according to age group, particularly for younger learners. However, particular emphasis should be placed on the CULT Briefing’s recommendation to use learning-specific AI-enhanced technologies (i.e. not GenAI) in education, as these could yield positive cognitive gains in the long term. Further regulatory recommendations are also based on this premise, including novel cognitive impact assessments, evidence standards for educational AI claims and mandatory pedagogical evaluations prior to school procurement. Unexpectedly, however, there is no bifurcated approach to regulating GenAI versus AI-enhanced learning technologies. The briefing does not propose binding or formal mitigations to protect the right to quality in education in the light of GenAI, and instead creates the impression that the suggested amendments have been designed  for education-specific AI. From here it is not implausible to infer that GenAI is too general to be equipped with such guardrails.

Thus, instead of arguing to attain the right to education qua the use and deployment of GenAI, evidence suggests to argue for the opposite: the right to education is not saved, instead it is infringed. This dichotomy should alarm policy makers, teachers, and social institutions to steer the narrative away from benefits to perils. The normal development of (meta-) cognitive skills is perturbated in a way that the goal of high-quality in education can no longer be achieved with this tool, but is instead jeopardised by it.

The EU AI Act’s recommendation to use GenAI in education to develop digital literacy and critical thinking skills is contradictory. Rather than supporting the right to a quality education, it is being undermined. Furthermore, the two mitigation strategies presented do not adequately minimise the risk of arbitrary cognitive offloading when using GenAI.

The CULT Briefing provides crucial insights when it argues that distinguishing between GenAI and AI-enhanced learning technologies is of fundamental importance. It proposes a regulatory approach that introduces a novel criterion to assess the ‘positive cognitive impact’ of an AI system. AI systems used in the classroom should therefore be restricted to those specifically designed as educational digital tools and marketed and sold as such. GenAI cannot be included in this category. It is precisely the generalness of GenAI that can lead to cognitive and societal harm. In contrast, AI-enhanced learning technologies are specific; for instance, learning management systems provide learners with tailored motivation based on their behaviour and progress.
The briefing highlights the impossibility of reconciling general-purpose AI systems with student-centred values, such as contextualised problem-setting and problem-solving that emphasise cognitive development, and knowledge transmission.

This is merely the tip of the iceberg, and it entails further unconsidered pitfalls. To address the conflictual proposal of the EU AI Act the more directly, means to adjust recital 56. This change should reflect the insight that only an adapted AI system can be in a position to not infringe on the right to quality education.

In other words, an amendment of recital 56 seems necessary.

The use of AI Systems is considered fruitful for high-quality digital education and training when all learners and teachers are enabled to acquire and share the necessary digital skills and competences, including media literacy, and critical thinking, to take an active part in the economy, society, and in democratic processes.(…). General purpose AI-systems do not fulfill this objective.”

The shift from the question of how GenAI might be handled within the context of high-quality education to the realisation that general AI is entirely unsuitable for the educational context gives rise to a new normative framework. So if GenAI were not used – and consequently the digital skills that can only be acquired through GenAI were not taught – would this constitute a violation of the right to education, or is a new understanding of digital skills required instead? Does “to prompt engineer” constitute a fundamental digital skills?

Declaring GenAI an AI system with limited use for specific domains where generalness is more beneficial than harmful could cause GenAI to lose its naturalised status. This would pave the way for education to make use of AI-enhanced learning technologies, through which digital skills could be developed, and the problem of arbitrary cognitive offloading could be solved.

It seems that the generalness of GenAI acts as a catalyst for arbitrary cognitive offloading, thereby rendering it unsuitable for educational use. Excluding it from school curricula, in turn, would prevent the teaching of digital skills associated with its use. This raises the question: which digital skills would be considered as such if GenAI was not a generally accessible AI system, but was instead replaced by a multitude of specialised AI-enhanced purpose-built technologies? Would the skills acquired in this way not be particularly valuable precisely if GenAI was no longer the standard AI system? What if a new norm for specialised, specific-purpose- applications was established? Whether it be resilient microservice software architectures, biodiversity approaches or diversified supply chain management: diverse student-centred AI learning systems promise to advance critical thinking and problem-solving whilst significantly reducing the risks of single-system dependency, a cognitive, infrastructural and political terms alike.

Bibliography

Carr, N. (2008). Is Google Making Us Stupid? Atlantic Monthly, 302(56–62 July/August). https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/07/is-google-making-us-stupid/306868/

Chen, A., Xiang, M., Zhou, J., Jia, J., Shang, J., Li, X., Gašević, D., & Fan, Y. (2025). Unpacking help-seeking process through multimodal learning analytics: A comparative study of ChatGPT vs Human expert. Computers & Education, 226, 105198. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.compedu.2024.105198

Chounta, D. I.-A. (2026). Artificial Intelligence in Classrooms: Cognitive Dimensions. EPRS: European Parliamentary Research Service. https://coilink.org/20.500.12592/3cf1fxv

European Commission. Statistical Office of the European Union. (2022). Young people in Europe: A statistical summary 2022. Publications Office. https://doi.org/10.2785/684958

European Data Protection Supervisor. (2025). AI Act Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 – Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act) (Text with EEA relevance). Publications Office of the European Union. https://doi.org/10.2804/4225375

Fan, Y., Tang, L., Le, H., Shen, K., Tan, S., Zhao, Y., Shen, Y., Li, X., & Gašević, D. (2025). Beware of metacognitive laziness: Effects of generative artificial intelligence on learning motivation, processes, and performance. British Journal of Educational Technology, 56(2), 489–530. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjet.13544

Fisher, M., Goddu, M. K., & Keil, F. C. (2015). Searching for explanations: How the Internet inflates estimates of internal knowledge. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 144(3), 674–687. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000070

Gerlich, M. (2025). AI Tools in Society: Impacts on Cognitive Offloading and the Future of Critical Thinking (SSRN Scholarly Paper No. 5082524). Social Science Research Network. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5082524

Holmes, W. (2023). The Unintended Consequences of Artificial Intelligence and Education. Education International.

Kosmyna, N., Hauptmann, E., Yuan, Y. T., Situ, J., Liao, X.-H., Beresnitzky, A. V., Braunstein, I., & Maes, P. (2025). Your Brain on ChatGPT: Accumulation of Cognitive Debt when Using an AI Assistant for Essay Writing Task (arXiv:2506.08872). arXiv. https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2506.08872

Lehmann, M., & Cornelius, P. B. (2025). AI Meets the Classroom: When Do Large Language Models Harm Learning? https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.09047

Lodge, J. M., & Loble, L. (2026). Artificial intelligence, cognitive offloading and implications for education (p. 1487662 Bytes). University of Technology Sydney. https://doi.org/10.71741/4PYXMBNJAQ.31302475

Marzano, R. J., & Kendall, J. S. (2007). The New Taxonomy of Educational Objectives (2nd edn). Corwin Press.

Monzon, N., & Hays, F. A. (2025). Leveraging Generative Artificial Intelligence to Improve Motivation and Retrieval in Higher Education Learners. JMIR Medical Education, 11(1), e59210. https://doi.org/10.2196/59210

OECD. (2023). Generative AI in the classroom: From hype to reality? EDU/EDPC 2023-11.

OECD. (2024). Reader’s guide: Do Adults Have the Skills They Need to Thrive in a Changing World? (OECD Skills Studies). OECD. https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/do-adults-have-the-skills-they-need-to-thrive-in-a-changing-world_b263dc5d-en/full-report/reader-s-guide_aee63130.html

OECD. (2026). OECD Digital Education Outlook 2026: Exploring Effective Uses of Generative AI in Education. OECD Digital Education Outlook, 2026. https://doi.org/10.1787/062a7394-en

Pollmann, A. (Host). (2026, May 31). KI in der Wissenschaft: Das Ende der Bildung? [Broadcast]. Deutschlandradio. https://www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/ki-in-der-wissenschaft-das-ende-der-bildung-100.html

Risko, E. F., & Gilbert, S. J. (2016). Cognitive Offloading. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 20(9), 676–688. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2016.07.002

Roebers, C. M. (2017). Executive function and metacognition: Towards a unifying framework of cognitive self-regulation. Developmental Review, 45, 31–51. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dr.2017.04.001

Rose, J. (2026, April 30). The more young people use AI, the more they hate it. The Verge. https://www.theverge.com/ai-artificial-intelligence/920401/gen-z-ai

Singh, A., Taneja, K., Guan, Z., & Ghosh, A. (2025). Protecting Human Cognition in the Age of AI (arXiv:2502.12447). arXiv. https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2502.12447

Stiftung Vodafone. (2025). AI in European Schools. Vodafone Foundation. https://www.vodafone-stiftung.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/AI_in_European_schools_A_European_report_comparing_seven_countries_IPSOS_Vodafone_Foundation_EN.pdf

Sweller, J., van Merrienboer, J. J. G., & Paas, F. G. W. C. (1998). Cognitive Architecture and Instructional Design. Educational Psychology Review, 10(3), 251–296. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022193728205

Thevenot, C., Krenger, M., & Poletti, C. (2025). Finger counting as a key tool for the development of children’s numerical skills. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 252, 106156. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2024.106156

UNICEF. (2000). Defining quality in education: A paper presented by UNICEF at a meeting of the International Working Group on Education. UNICEF. Education Section. Programme Division. https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000199104

United Nations. (1948). Universal declaration of human rights. United Nations. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights

Ward, A. F. (2013). Supernormal: How the Internet Is Changing Our Memories and Our Minds. Psychological Inquiry, 24(4), 341–348. https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2013.850148

Ward, D. M. W., Adrian F. (2013, December 1). The Internet Has Become the External Hard Drive for Our Memories. Scientific American. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-internet-has-become-the-external-hard-drive-for-our-memories/

Willingham, D. T. (2019). How to Teach Critical Thinking. https://education.nsw.gov.au/content/dam/main-education/teaching-and-learning/education-for-a-changing-world/media/documents/How-to-teach-critical-thinking-Willingham.pdf

Winne, P. H. (2021). Cognition, Metacognition, and Self-Regulated Learning. In K. Hytten (Ed.), Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Education (p. 0). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190264093.013.1528

Xu, X., Qiao, L., Cheng, N., Liu, H., & Zhao, W. (2025). Enhancing self-regulated learning and learning experience in generative AI environments: The critical role of metacognitive support. British Journal of Educational Technology, 56(5), 1842–1863. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjet.13599

Yan, L., Greiff, S., Teuber, Z., & Gašević, D. (2024). Promises and challenges of generative artificial intelligence for human learning. Nature Human Behaviour, 8(10), 1839–1850. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-024-02004-5

Zainuddin, Z., Churiyah, M., Xiaoyu, W., & Halili, S. H. (2026). From AI literacy to cognitive AI safety: Rethinking safe AI use in education.

Zhai, C., Wibowo, S., & Li, L. D. (2024). The effects of over-reliance on AI dialogue systems on students’ cognitive abilities: A systematic review. Smart Learning Environments, 11(1), 28. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40561-024-00316-7


[1] According to the newest statistics cited in the report “Young people in Europe 2022”, 73 million young people between 15-29 live in the EU in 2021 (European Commission. Statistical Office of the European Union., 2022, p. 5). No later census data is available. 

[2] Explicitely refering to two educational spaces: 1) the classroom or the university as on premise-space where teachers and peers are present, and 2) the educational non-formal setting for homework or project work, alone or with peers, parents etc.

[3] Thre are good reasons why this is the case, e.g. sovereignty of nations; geographical, social and cultural differences. Appointed by the United Nations, the transnational agency UNESCO is responsible to establish conditions that supports the national provision of quality education.

[4] The term student-centred here is used to expressed the opposite of teacher-centred that illustrates a shift away from a unidimensional transfer of knowledge from the teacher to the student towards a constructivist approach.

[5] Akin to metacognitive skill that enable learners to monitor and plan their task engagement, executive functions, as their name suggests, allow them to reguate their behavior and thinking, e.g. maintaining focus, continuing the work even when motivation declines, to control frustration or impulsive behaviors. For further details about the effect of executive functions and metacognition for cognitive development, please see Roebers (2017).

[6] This categorisation reflects active stakeholders in the education sector and was also made, for example, in the report “The Unintended Consequences of Artificial Intelligence and Education” by Education International (Holmes, 2023).

[7] Categories of low-, high- and meta-cognitive tasking have been chosen according to Bloom’s Revised Taxonomy.

[8] Task with highest arbitrary offloading potential. The more kinds of cognitive involvement are required, the higher the potential for arbitrariness.

[9] 63.8% of all young people use AI Tools and thereof 32.7% use AI tools for formal education, that means approximately 20% of young people in the EU use AI tools for formal education.

[10] The Socratic Method is an argumentative dialogue informing a structured way to learn and practice critical thinking. Among others, Monzon and Hays (2025) propose using GenAI to create desirable difficulties, instead of bypassing effort.

[11] Exact numbers of functional illiteracy are particularly difficult to estimate. An overall estimate of illiteracy worldwide claims that there are around 750 Million people who cannot read and write sufficiently but it is unclear if this metric accounts for functionally illiterate populations.

[12] Furthermore, the European Commission’s Ethical Guidelines on the Use of AI and Data in Teaching and Learning for Educators (2022) are cited as the source for the following recommendations.

[13] AI Safety includes research, governance and application of AI Systems that prevent harmful use or mitigates harmful effects of AI Systems. However, the phrasing “cognitively safe AI use” has no established meaning at the time of the Briefing’s publication date. One study from May 2026 by Zainuddin et al. (2026) tries to introduce the concept of “cognitively safe AI use, but this is only a first attempt.

Policy gap: AI and the determinants of public health

There is growing interest in how artificial intelligence (AI) can be applied in public health – from individual-level interventions such as diagnosis, treatment, and patient follow-up in healthcare, to broader public health applications like health data analysis or pandemic response. Ongoing debates about regulation have already led to guidelines, including those from the WHO (2021, 2024).

An important but neglected policy area concerns the secondary effects of AI technologies on public health. Here is a clear regulatory gap. Previous technological revolutions such as electricity and the internet reshaped society and lifestyles, with downstream public health consequences – such as rising sedentary behavior and cardiovascular disease. Already today, we can identify several potential risks and opportunities linked to AI development that must be addressed if we are to safeguard population health in the future.

Key determinants of health likely to be affected include work, relationships, cognition, physical activity, and psychosocial stress. Below are some examples and potential policy responses.

Work

The labor market impacts of AI remain uncertain, but some groups – such as translators and illustrators – are already reporting falling demand due to generative AI (Society of Authors, 2024). Even with opportunities for retraining, job insecurity and layoffs are often perceived as personal crises, with heightened risks of substance use disorders, depression, cardiovascular disease, and suicide (Kim & von dem Knesebeck, 2015; Zellers et al., 2025). Policymakers must be prepared from a public health perspective, for example through preventive health communication and scalable stepped-care interventions that can be expanded as needs increase.

Relationships

Strong social relationships are among the most important protective factors for health and wellbeing (World Happiness Report, 2024). Their effect on mortality risk is comparable to that of well-known risk factors such as smoking and binge drinking (Holt-Lunstad et al., 2010).

While AI services may help alleviate loneliness or coach users toward better social skills, there is also a risk that they replace human relationships due to their convenience. Researchers such as Mahari and Pataranutaporn (2024) have called for regulation in this area. One proposal is to mandate that non-humanized chatbots be the default in vulnerable settings such as health and wellness apps, to reduce the risk of users anthropomorphizing and misusing the technology (De Freitas & Cohen, 2025).

Cognition

AI tools may enhance cognition by supporting personalized learning or compensating for bias. At the same time, emerging evidence suggests they might impair higher-order functions over time. Just as books and calculators shaped cognition through cognitive offloading, AI tools may lead to declines in problem-solving, planning, and decision-making – especially among younger generations growing up with them. Although research is still limited, small-scale studies point in this direction (Gerlich, 2025).

Such changes could have broad societal implications, including dependence on AI, loss of critical thinking, and increased vulnerability to manipulation. They also carry direct health consequences: cognitive functioning is closely linked to outcomes such as emotion regulation, longevity, and resilience against neurological diseases like Alzheimer’s (Lövdén et al., 2020).

Sedentary Behavior

AI-driven tools for both work and leisure risk reinforcing already high levels of sedentary time by shifting more tasks to screen-based, automated, and remote interactions. Prolonged sedentary behavior is associated with higher risks of all-cause mortality, cardiovascular disease, type 2 diabetes, and certain cancers, even after adjusting for leisure-time physical activity (Biswas et al., 2015).

Psychosocial Stress

Rapid social change, including AI adoption, can heighten uncertainty, worry, and job insecurity – all well-established psychosocial stressors linked to poor health outcomes, including cardiovascular disease, mental illness, and elevated mortality (Guidi et al., 2021). Strengthening digital self-efficacy can help buffer these effects (Zhao & Wu, 2025), highlighting the need to monitor and address psychosocial consequences alongside technical and clinical AI governance.

Catastrophic Risks

Alongside gradual effects, there is also a class of extreme health risks from AI systems, including catastrophic accidents or loss of human control. Though their probability is debated, the potential scale-up to and including human survival – makes them relevant to a comprehensive public health framework. As with rare but devastating hazards like nuclear accidents or novel pandemics, AI warrants systematic assessment and planning.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

To ensure AI development produces the best possible outcomes for public health, it is not enough to regulate AI applications within healthcare alone. Public health must be integrated into all AI policies, alongside other overarching sustainability perspectives such as climate, equity, and human rights. Here are three proposals:

1. Integrate public health into AI regulation

Frameworks governing AI development and deployment should explicitly include public health provisions. For example, the EU AI Act (Article 5) prohibits AI systems designed to manipulate user behavior in ways that cause significant harm to self or others. The EU Digital Services Act (Article 34) requires very large online platforms to assess and mitigate systemic risks, including those affecting public health and mental wellbeing. Digital services with underage users must be safe and free from harmful content, regardless of their size.

As with food safety standards, technologies should meet minimum health requirements. Consumers have a right not to be exposed to foreseeable risks such as disrupted sleep, distorted body image, or social dysfunction, where such harms can be anticipated and prevented.

2. Build AI capacity within public health institutions

Knowledge of AI remains limited among many public health professionals and officials. Capacity must be strengthened through education, recruitment, and expert networks so that AI-related challenges can be managed at local, regional, national, and international levels.

Global advisory bodies such as the WHO could support governments in integrating public health perspectives into national AI strategies, beyond the medical applications currently emphasized.

3. Stimulate research on AI and public health

Research on the public health effects of AI remains scarce. Neither the International AI Safety Report (2025) nor the MIT AI Risk Repository currently list health risks as a category. Most existing studies focus narrowly on healthcare applications rather than upstream determinants of health.

We need systematic investigation into emerging effects as well as foresight analyses to anticipate future impacts. By mitigating risks and promoting health benefits, AI can be developed in ways that support rather than undermine public health.

This is an initial attempt to articulate the secondary public health dimensions of AI as a societal challenge. I welcome comments, suggestions, and ideas.

References

Bengio, Y., Mindermann, S., Privitera, D., et al. (2025). International AI Safety Report (Research Series No. DSIT 2025/001). UK Department for Science, Innovation & Technology. 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/679a0c48a77d250007d313ee/International_
AI_Safety_Report_2025_accessible_f.pdf

Biswas, A., Oh, P. I., Faulkner, G. E. J., et al. (2015). Sedentary time and its association with risk for disease incidence, mortality, and hospitalization in adults: A systematic review and meta?analysis. Annals of Internal Medicine, 162(2), 123-132. https://doi.org/10.7326/M14-1651

De Freitas, J., & Cohen, A. (2025). Unregulated emotional risks of AI wellness apps. Nature Machine Intelligence, 7(6), 813-815. https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-025-01051-5

Helliwell, J. F., Layard, R., Sachs, J. D., De Neve, J.-E., Aknin, L. B., & Wang, S. (Eds.). (2024). World Happiness Report 2024. Wellbeing Research Centre, University of Oxford. (World Happiness Report)

Holt-Lunstad, J., Smith, T. B., & Layton, J. B. (2010). Social relationships and mortality risk: A meta?analytic review. PLoS Medicine, 7(7), e1000316. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1000316

Gerlich, M. (2025). AI tools in society: Impacts on cognitive offloading and the future of critical thinking. Societies, 15(1), 6. https://doi.org/10.3390/soc15010006

Guidi, J., Lucente, M., Sonino, N., & Fava, G. A. (2021). Allostatic load and its impact on health: A systematic review. Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, 90(1), 11-27. https://doi.org/10.1159/000510696

Kim, T. J., & von dem Knesebeck, O. (2015). Is an insecure job better for health than having no job at all? A systematic review of studies investigating the health-related risks of both job insecurity and unemployment. BMC Public Health, 15, 985. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-015-2313-1

Lövdén, M., et al. (2020). Education and cognitive functioning across the life span. Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 21(1), 6-41. https://doi.org/10.1177/1529100620920576

Mahari, P., & Pataranutaporn, P. (2024, August 5). We need to prepare for “addictive intelligence”. MIT Technology Review. https://www.technologyreview.com/2024/08/05/1095600/we-need-to-prepare-for-addictive-intelligence/

Slattery, P., Saeri, A. K., Grundy, E. A. C., et al. (2024). The AI Risk Repository: A comprehensive meta?review, database, and taxonomy of risks from artificial intelligence. arXiv. https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.12622 (arXiv)

Society of Authors. (2024, April 11). SOA survey reveals a third of translators and quarter of illustrators losing work to AI. Society of Authors. https://www.societyofauthors.org/2024/04/11/soa-survey-reveals-a-third-of-translators-and-quarter-of-illustrators-losing-work-to-ai/

Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act). (2022, October 27). Official Journal of the European Union, L 277, 1-102. http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj

Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act). (2024, July 12). Official Journal of the European Union, L 2024/1689. http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj

World Health Organization. (2021). Ethical guidelines for the application of AI in public health (applications such as screening, treatment, pandemic response strategies). https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240029200

World Health Organization. (2024, January 18). WHO releases AI ethics and governance guidance for large multi?modal models in health care and medical research. https://www.who.int/news/item/18-01-2024-who-releases-ai-ethics-and-governance-guidance-for-large-multi-modal-models

Zellers, S., Azzi, E., Latvala, A., Kaprio, J., & Maczulskij, T. (2025). Causally-informative analyses of the effect of job displacement on all-cause and specific-cause mortality from the 1990s Finnish recession until 2020: A population registry study of private sector employees. Social Science & Medicine, 370, 117867. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2025.117867

Zhao, X., & Wu, Y. (2025). Artificial intelligence job substitution risks, digital self?efficacy, and mental health among employees. Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, 67(5), e302-e310. https://doi.org/10.1097/JOM.0000000000003335